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Building the Northeast Asian Community
Lyou, BYUNG-WOON*
I. INTRODUCTION: REGIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE NEED FOR A
NORTHEAST ASIAN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
Asia is one of the most socio-politically divided regions in the world. Without
regional cooperation,' it faces difficulty in the world market, sometimes receiving
unfair treatment. Asia contains more than half of the world's population,2 but
Asian countries have a relatively small share of international organizations.'
Given these facts, it is meaningful to explore the need and legal basis for a North-
east Asian Community (NEAC), which would be an economically integrated re-
gional trade association composed of Korea, China, and Japan.4
Within the last decade, the possibility of an East Asian regional trade agree-
ment (RTA) or a much broader Asia-Pacific integration has been debated exten-
*Lecturer at Korea University School of Law, SJD (2003), LLM, Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington. LLD (completion of course-work), LLM (1997), LLB (1988), Korea Univer-
sity School of Law. I am deeply grateful to two professors: Former Dean Alfred Aman of Indiana
University School of Law who provided expert guidance on globalization, constant support, and
encouragement and Professor Lyou, Byung-Hwa, my brother, President of the Transnational
Law and Business University and former Dean of Korea University School of Law who has
taught me what law and a personality are. My study is affected by his works, especially Interna-
tional Law and The Philosophy of Law.
1. The lack of an institutional framework for dialogue and cooperation has been a distinctive
feature of East Asia. See EAST ASIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: REPORT OF A SPECIAL STUDY
GROUP 7 (Charles E. Morrison coord., 2001) [hereinafter EAST ASIA].
2. At present, the estimated world population is 6.3 billion, the Asian population is 3.8 billion,
and the Northeast Asian population 1.5 billion (as described in note 4, infra). WORLD POPULATION
2002 WALLCHART (U.N. population division, 2002) available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/
publications (last visited Mar. 18, 2004).
3. For example, the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2847 (XXVI) states, "the 54 members
of the [U.N. Economic and Social] Council should include 14 members from African States, 11
from Asian States, 10 from Latin American and Caribbean States, 13 from Western European
and Other States, and six from Eastern European States." See G.A. Res. 2847, U.N. GAOR, 26th
Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 67-68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2847 (XXVI) (1971), available at httpi/
www.un.org/documents; Press Release, United Nations General Assembly, General Assembly
Elects 18 New Members to UN Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. GA/9940 (Oct. 26, 2001),
available at http://www.un.org/ News/Press/docs/2001/ga9940.doc.htm.
4. More precisely, China (including Hong Kong and Macao), Japan, South Korea, North
Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia.
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sively 5 Though not currently regionalized, Asia could be divided into three
groups.6 In the Southeast Asian region, there is the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN).' ASEAN established the Asian Free Trade Area
(AFTA) in 1993 and included Cambodia as its tenth member in 1999. In 1983,
Australia and New Zealand organized the Australian/New Zealand Closer
Economic Trade Relations Agreement (ANZCERTA) which has strengthened
their cooperation with Asian countries, following the United Kingdom's entry
into the European Union (EU). South Asia, the second regional group, is made
up of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, whose economic contribution
in Asia is relatively small. The group remains divided by religious conflicts and
a contentious history. A third regional group, Northeast Asia, has the potential
to develop into a similar economic community because of the increasing neces-
sity of integration among neighboring countries.
A recently proposed formation of an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC)9
aimed to create an extended form of ASEAN, with China, Japan, and South
Korea as its core states.' 0 A regional community requires a certain degree of cul-
tural homogeneity, what is sometimes called "an inherent regional civil society.""
Given the strong societal differences between Northeast and Southeast Asia, it
5. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
464 (3d ed. 1995).
6. Considering the current situation, it is reasonable to exclude Central and Western Asia.
7. ASEAN was established to accelerate economic growth, and social and cultural develop-
ment, and to improve peace and stability in the region. ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declara-
tion), Aug. 8, 1967, available at http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2004).
8. In 2002, AFFA-CER ministers established the Closer Economic Partnership (CEP).
Ministerial Declaration of the AFTA-CER Closer Economic Partnership (Sept. 2002), at
www.dfat.gov.au/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration].
9. Originally, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed the formation of the
East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) which was criticized by the United States. The East
Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) was formed in 2000 as a replacement. It is a diluted version of
the EAEG and is envisaged as an informal consultative grouping of Asian nations. See Shim Jae
Hoon & Robert Delfs, Block Politics, FAR E. EcoN. REV., Nov. 28, 1991, at 26.
10. The EAEC consists of the ASEAN member states, plus Japan, Korea, and China
("ASEAN+3"). It provides a forum for North and Southeast Asia to discuss regional issues. See
Santha Oorjitham, ASEAN+3 = "EAEC, " Building Ties Across the Region, Mar. 15, 2000, at http://
www.asiaweek.com. Early warning mechanisms for trade, finance, and human security are on
the agenda of the EAEC. Wendy K. Dobson, Deeper Integration in East Asia: Implication for the In-
ternational Economic System, in EAST ASIA, supra note 1, at 21.
11. Bj6rn Hettne, Global Market versus Regionalism, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER
159 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000).
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would be more workable to establish the NEAC, while Southeast Asia strength-
ens AFTA, than to extend ASEAN to encompass Northeast Asia. 2
With the end of the Cold War, Asia-Pacific (including the Americas and
Oceania) intergovernmental cooperation systems emerged from the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) process, in 1989. APEC is a loose organization
which has regional, multilateral, and interregional characteristics.13 "The subse-
quent Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM) established an inter-regional dialogue sys-
tem between East Asia with the European Union.'' 14
A regional community like the EU 5 established in Northeast Asia would
provide several key benefits. Economically, the Northeast Asian countries
would receive increased efficiency through economies of scale; increased pro-
ductivity stimuli; strengthened bargaining power in the international market;
and the "trade creation effect." Even though economic theory does not support
such integration in every instance, a regional community, on the whole, im-
proves its productive abilities with the creation of gains from trade.
The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory (also called the factor-price equaliza-
tion theorem), which is based on the theory of comparative advantage, postu-
lates that welfare improvement within a community can be achieved through
the exchange of goods created by each state's plentiful factors of production and
through price equalization. 6 Free trade in a regional community brings opti-
mum allocative efficiency by use of specialized factors of production. Given an
extended opportunity, the use of these specialized factors would result in econo-
mies of scale and productivity stimulation. This theory, however, is premised on
12. As the CEP shows, if the expectations of the two regions have been met, the scope of the re-
gional agreements would expand by a "spill-over" effect. See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 8;
Winfried Lang, New Regionalism in a Changing World Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 45 (Karel Wellens ed., 1998).
13. "APEC is not an exercise in regional integration but intergovernmental cooperation." Rich-
ard Higgott, The International Political Economy of Regionalism: The Asia-Pacific and Europe Com-
pared, in REGIONALISM AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: EUROPE, ASIA AND THE AMERICAS 49
(William D. Coleman & Goeffrey R.D. Underhill eds., 1998). The authors call it a "market-led open
regionalism." Id. at 43. For a more detailed description of how APEC developed, see id. 42-49.
14. See EAST AsIA,supra note 1, at 7.
15. The Asia-Pacific region could look to Europe for empirical and theoretical insight. Higgott,
supra note 13, at 42.
16. David Ricardo's comparative advantage and H-O theory support free trade, which is no
longer considered a zero-sum game. See THOMAS A. PUGEL & PETER H. LINDERT, INTERNATIONAL
EcoNoMics 52-57 (11 th ed. 2000).
Lyou, BYUNG-WOON
the idea that each country participant has different, plentiful factors of produc-
tion and that these factors are homogenous.
A RTA brings with it two kinds of trade effects. One is the trade creation ef-
fect: this refers to the expansion of trade with efficient suppliers inside the com-
munity. The other is the "trade diversion effect," which refers to a shift in trade
from the efficient suppliers outside the community.to inefficient suppliers lo-
cated inside it.17 If the trade creation effect is larger than the trade diversion ef-
fect, then economic integration will bring a Pareto improvement. In the EU,
regional integration has led to gains of about one percent of GDP.Is Moreover,
the unmeasured dynamic gains that come from economies of scale and produc-
tivity stimuli make the net effect much larger. 9 Even though some social losses
can take place through integrated policies, such as the EU's Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP)," these are the harmonization costs for the integration.
Through the establishment of a regional community, the Northeast Asian coun-
tries could reduce these negative integration effects.
Socio-politically, the Northeast Asian countries would strengthen their po-
sitions in international organizations and societies as a result of integrating into
a regional economic community. The EU deals effectively with the United
States by using a single discussion channel in matters like trade and disputes
settlement, while Korea, Japan and China tackle the problems individually and
often ineffectively. Increased exposure to the effects of international markets re-
quires not only domestic policy adjustments but also a collective policy arrange-
ment." Isolation also creates problems in electing or appointing officials to
international organization; Asian countries are thus often unfairly treated.
Thus, the countries need a push forward to create a regional community.
17. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 465.
18. See PUGEL & LINDERT,SUpra note 16, at 220.
19. The 1988 Cecchini Report estimated a 5 to 6 percent net increase of the EU's GDP. See PAOLO
CECCHINI ET AL., THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE 1992: THE BENEFITS OF A SINGLE MARKET (1988);
MICHAEL EMERSON ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF 1992: THE E.C. COMMISSION'S ASSESSMENT OF THE
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET 1-10(1988); PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE
BJRCA, EU LAW 1166 (3d ed. 2003).
20. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
1063-1100 (1993).
21. "The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in
the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies." The Treaty on




Transition from relative heterogeneity to increased social homogeneity in
areas such as culture, economic policies, and security, in fact, is the process of re-
gional integration.22 Northeast Asia, in which social homogeneity is ahistorical,
lacks experiences of social interchange, and in this sense is fundamentally differ-
ent from Europe. Even though the Chinese Character culture, Confucianism,
and Mahayana Buddhism influenced all of Northeast Asia considerably,23 his-
torically there have been only minimal diplomatic interchanges between gov-
ernments and only small-scale, unofficial trade in the frontier areas.24 Moreover,
the Northeast Asian countries' levels of economic development differ greatly.
Certain requirements must be attained before progressing to new levels of eco-
nomic integration, and basic socio-cultural factors may limit this process, as is
evident from European integration.25 Until now, the Northeast Asian peoples
have not realistically considered regional integration, because of gaps in social
homogeneity, poor experiences in social exchanges, and differences in economic
development. However, there is increasing recognition of the need for a North-
east Asian organization that reflects competitive regionalism and globalization.
Regionalism can be approached in several ways. One approach, which is
rooted in the neo-functionalists' theory, describes regionalism as the incremental
creation of regional institutions in response to various functional demands, such
as enhancing the economic welfare of participating states.26 Another approach,
rooted in federalist theory, is the model of fair distribution of power and compe-
tence at a level below a global organization.27 This approach, known as "construc-
tivism," focuses on the communal identity in regional integration. 28 In
22. Hettne, supra note 11, at 159.
23. Ho-Chul Lee & Mary P. McNulty, East Asia's Dynamic Development Model and the Republic
of Korea's Experiences, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2987, at 6 (Mar. 2003), avail-
able at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/24755-wps2987.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2004).
24. Concerning the past relationship among Korea, China, and Japan, see WILLIAM E.
HENTHORN, A HISTORY OF KOREA 152-58 (1971); KENNETH B. LEE, KOREA AND EAST ASIA: THE
STORY OF A PHOENIX 95-114 (1997); Quansheng Zhao, China and the Two Koreas, in THE Two
KOREAS AND THE UNITED STATES 130, 134 (Wonmo Dong ed., 2000).
25. JACKSON,supra note 5, at 211.
26. Lang, supra note 12, at 45; Edward D. Mansfield & Helen V. Milner, The Political Economy
of Regionalism: An Overview, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONALISM 5-8 (Edward D. Mans-
field & Helen V. Milner eds., 1997).
27. Lang, supra note 12, at 45.
28. See Charles A. Kupchan, Regionalizing Europe's Security: The Case for a New Mitteleuropa, in
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONALISM, supra note 26, at 209-15.
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constructivism, regional integration is "ideational products."29 This approach em-
phasizes collective security, rather than a functional or economic need for the re-
gional integration.3" This Note focuses on the neo-functionalist theory, since the
main purpose of the NEAC would be the Pareto improvement of its members.
Presently, the causes of regional integration are primarily economic. When
NATO lost its original "raison d'tre," regionalism faced a new situation: while se-
curity considerations became less salient, economic development became a central
issue. Neo-functionalism has to meet new threats, such as environmental risks,
drug-trafficking, and global terrorism.3' In addition to regionalism, globalization
complicates these issues. Globalization is described as "flows of trade and finance
between the major regions in the world economy, while equivalent flows within
them can be differentiated in terms of local, national and regional clusters." 2 Both
globalization and regionalism stimulate the interchange of goods and finance as
well as the integration of subunits. Globalization and regionalism are thus both
types of integration.
Regionalism continuously influences all aspects of life, from culture to politics
to the economy. "Within the economic, or trade realm, the impact of regionalism
has been especially pronounced."33 Mass regionalism, rooted in neo-functionalism,
was initiated after the collapse of the Cold War regime and with the beginning of
WTO system.34 Europe has since been rearranged as a successful regional commu-
nity. The United States has free trade agreements (FTAs) with Canada and Mexico
29. Id.
30. See id. at 209, 211-15.
31. See Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress, East
Asia Vision Group Report 2001, at 18, para. 65, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/
report200l.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2004) [hereinafter East Asia Vision Group Report]; Lang,
supra note 12, at 47; see also 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, 7th
ASEAN Summit and the 5th ASEAN + 3 Summit, Nov. 5, 2001, available at http://www
.aseansec.org/529.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2004); APEC Leaders Statement on Counter-
terrorism, Oct. 21, 2001, at http://www.chinaembassy-org.be/ (last visited Mar.18, 2004).
32. See David Held et al., Rethinking Globalization, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER,
supra note 11, at 55.
33. Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier between Regionalism and Multilateralism: a New Perspec-
tive on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419, 419 (2001).
34. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 464-65. "As the globalism of today is different that during the
1920s, regionalism of today is different than the 'destructive regionalism' of the 1930s that set the
stage for the creation of exclusive blocs, deepened the impact of the Great Depression, and
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(NAFTA) as well as with Israel. At the Summit of the Americas, heads of state rep-
resenting thirty-four American countries have reaffirmed their political commit-
ment to strengthen hemispheric relations by approving the finalization of a Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by January 2005.35 In Latin America, not only
may a broad Latin American free trade area result through a combination of the
MERCOSUR and Andean Pacts, but that free trade area itself may be merged
with NAFTA into the FTAA. In addition to ASEAN (AFTA) in Asia, some re-
gional groups in central, eastern, and southern Africa have formed a continent-
wide African Economic Community (AEC).
The growth of country membership in the WTO has not adversely affected
the growth of regionalism. "Over 170 RTAs are currently in force."36 In fact, glo-
bal flourishing of RTAs makes Northeast Asian countries feel isolated. Global-
ization can also be defined as the growing integration of world markets, which
brings denationalization of politics, markets, and laws. While China and North
Korea have insisted on nearly absolute state sovereignty, there are increasing
limitations on that sovereignty because of these globalizing trends. 7 Globaliza-
tion asks for a combination of self-rule and shared rule.38
From the late 1960s to early 19 7 0s, because of the disappointment from the
post-colonial policies, Third World states applied regionalist practices toward
trade and economic cooperation among the developing countries. During the
Cold War, this regional hegemony created a sort of league of non-allied states.
This regionalism, which was used by the Third World as a justification for the
adoption of domestic policies such as socialism and the protection of infant na-
tional industries, did not advance globalization.39
ultimately resulted in the Second World War. For example, the EU is working on extending to
the East European countries through supporting them." Dennis Kennedy, Regional Trading Blocs,
Multilateralism and the New GATT Agreement: An Introduction, in REGIONAL TRADE BLOCS, MULTI-
LATERALISM, AND THE GATT: COMPLEMENTARY PATHS TO FREE TRADE I (Till Geiger & Dennis
Kennedy eds., 1996).
35. In order to lower the trade barriers of South American and Caribbean countries, which are
3.5 times higher than that of the United States, the United States pushed toward free trade agree-
ments. See ROBERT J. CARBAUGH, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 262 (1998).
36. See WTO, Regional Trade Agreements, at http://www.wto.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2004);
Teshome Mulat, Multilateralism and Africa's Regional Economic Communities, 32 J. WORLD TRADE
115, 116 (Aug. 1998).
37. See generally DANIEL J. ELAZAR, CONSTITUTIONALIZING GLOBALIZATION 17-22, 32-35 (1998).
38. Id. at 200.
39. See Mulat, supra note 36, at 115; see also Lang, supra note 12, at 45-46.
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By contrast, the popular paradigm today is free trade, globalization, and
substantial growth through competition." GATT's4' article XXIV42 restricts the
formation of regional fortresses, 3 or exclusive economic blocs. It requires that
any modern regionalism not be a malignant form but rather a bona fide form,
one favorable to globalization. The regionalism of today cannot afford to be
inward-looking because globalization has made markets more and more inter-
connected and interdependent.44 With GATT article XXIV, which makes
regionalism compatible with multilateralism, globalization has broken down
the traditional dichotomy between regionalism and multilateralism.
The regionalism of today4" responds to three aspects of globalization: the re-
placement of domestic markets by international markets;46 the decline of geo-
graphical determinants of money and labor; the continued intensification of
multinational and private policy-making structures. 7 Thus, a benign form of
regional integration has a positive effect on global trade liberalization. Global-
ization and regional integration can be seen as complementary processes, modi-
fying each other, in the formation of a new world order, even though they may
40. All of these are themes of the UNCTAD report. Globalization, Competition, Competitive-
ness and Development, U.N. Trade and Development Board, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. TD/B/44/20
(1998), available at www.unctad.org/en/docs/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
41. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT 1947], as amended by the Marrakesh Agreement, Establishing the World Trade Agree-
ment, Jan. 1, 1994 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; GATT 1947, as amended, supra, Annex IA, 33
I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT]; Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of
GATT, in GATT 1947, as amended, supra, Annex 1A(1)(d), 33 I.L.M. 1160 [hereinafter XXIV
Understanding].
42. Especially GATT, supra note 41, art. XXIV paras. 4,5(a).
43. A regional fortress could challenge the WTO. See Lang, supra note 12, at 46; BERNARD M.
HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
THE WTO AND BEYOND 360-61 (2d ed. 2001).
44. See Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a New Age Partnership: Joint Study Group
Report (2000), available at http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/kanzei/kal40l15b2.pdf (last visited Apr.
1, 2004) [hereinafter JSEPA Study Group].
45. "The geographical, historical, political and cultural contexts are sufficiently different as to
ensure different paths towards regional co-operation, but the context of managing regional eco-
nomic policy co-ordination in an era of globalization is the same for both European and Asian ac-
tors." Higgott, supra note 13, at 42.
46. While world GDP grew by six times between 1950 and 2000, international trade multiplied
by twenty times. In 1999, international trade represented 18 percent of the world GDP, compared
to 9 percent in 1965. See JSEPA Study Group, supra note 44, at §1-4.
47. See generally Susan Strange, The Defective State, 124 DAEDALUS 55 (1995).
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be based on different situations or concrete issues. 48 Another important force, ac-
celerating change in production and consumption patterns, is the rapid progress
of information and communications technology.49 The Internet, an important
method of doing business today, has contributed to a borderless global econ-
omy5° by removing physical distance.
In this recognition of these trends, Northeast Asia has shifted its attention
more and more toward the development of an institutional expression of its own
identity.5 In the past, Japan regarded the EU and the United States as its main
trade partners and was not very interested in its neighbor countries. In recent
years, there are remarkable signs that the Japanese are rediscovering their re-
gional identity, economically exemplified by Japan's vigorous promotion of the
Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement (JKFTA).5 2 The JKFTA could induce
China to participate in a regional community. China's WTO participation with
Taiwan in 2001" will promote free trade in this area once more. With China's
participation in the WTO, the WTO framework could serve as a common adi-
visor of Northeast Asia, accelerating trade regionalization. Moreover, both the
APEC and the ASEM have moved in recent years to keep up the momentum of
their early years.
48. See Hetme, supra note 11, at 156. "In many respects, globalization has crept up upon us and
the mechanisms developed to promote it such as the WTO or the EU and their regional counter-
parts" ELAZAR, supra note 37, at 3.
49. See JSEPA Study Group, supra note 44.
50. "A globalized economy run by overlapping and interconnected networks of state and non-
state actors in both public and private domains is mitigating the significance of space and terri-
tory." Higgott, supra note 13, at 59.
51. See EAST AsIA,supra note 1, at 4.
52. See Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement Joint Study Group Report (2003), available at http=//
www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/index.html (last visited Mar. 19,2004) [hereinafter JKFTA
Joint Study]. Japan agreed with Singapore on the Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a New
Age Partnership (JSEPA). See Joint Announcement by the Japanese and Singapore Prime Ministers
on the Completion of Negotiations of the JSEPA, Oct. 20, 2001, availableat http//www.mofa.go.jp/
region/asia-paci/singapore/ jsepa0l 10.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2004). Korea also promotes the
Korea-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (KSFTA). See KSFTA Joint Study Group Report (2003),
available at http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/PDF/CMT/FTAKSFTAJSG-Report.pdf (last visited
Mar. 19, 2004).
53. WTO, Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, Nov. 23, 2001, available at
http://www.wto.org/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
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Northeast Asia has a successful model of a regional community in the EU.54
In the case of the two Koreas, it should be noted that the unification of Germany
was achieved with the integration of West Europe, and the formation of the
EU.55 The unification of the two Koreas can be aided through a regional inte-
gration process as well. A considerable part of the unification cost, like EU's var-
ious integration funds,56 would be the cost of North Korea's accession to the
NEAC. The China-Taiwan problem is somewhat different; Taiwan does not
seek unification with China. The NEAC integration could be the answer to the
problem. If the process involved substantial integration, asking a partial restric-
tion on sovereignty, under supranational control, not only could it ease Taiwan's
apprehension of being absorbed by China, but also it could give China the same
effect of two regimes under one state.
It is important that the NEAC not act as a "regional fortress." Essentially, the
NEAC should not take regional protectionist measures. Such action would be
taken as a threat by non-members.57 As the trial of EAEC was considered by the
United States to encourage economic rivalry with Japan,58 similar regional exclu-
siveness also could be considered a hegemonic stance. The NEAC not only should
have good relations with the rest of the world, but also should pursue the common
good of the world. A benign form of regional integration does not imply division
of international society, because it strengthens the organizing international or glo-
bal society through the integration of regional unit. Good empirical evidence sug-
gests that the general political opposition of third countries to the EU, and its
exercise of international legal rights, has now largely disappeared.
59
This Note is composed of three main parts. Part II will define the proposed
NEAC. Focused on an economic integration and WTO rules, in order to define
54. "Europe is also a concrete model often referred to as an example to follow by other regional
organisations." Hettne, supra note 11, at 159.
55. Masao Okonogi, The North Korean Crisis and Japan's Choice, in THE Two KOREAS AND THE
UNITED STATES 119, 119-29 (Wonmo Dong ed., 2000).
56. See Pier Carlo Padoan, Regional Agreement as Clubs: The European Case, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF REGIONALISM,supra note 26, at 107, 115-16 (discussing integration in general).
57. The inherent exclusiveness of a regional economic community conflicts with the interests of
non-members. See Cho, supra note 33, at 420.
58. Malaysia expected Japan's leading role. See Anthony Rowley, The Malaysian Two-Step, FAR
E. ECON. REV., Apr. 18, 1991, at 70-71.
59. See Eileen Denza, The Community as a Member of International Organizations, in THE EURO-
PEAN UNION AND WORLD TRADE LAW: AFTER THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND at 3, 15 (Nicholas
Emiliou & David O' Keeffe eds., 1996).
266
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the NEAC, the present Northeast Asia situation and a reasonable degree of in-
tegration for countries in the region and the empirical implications of the EU
should be considered. Part III discusses the economic necessity of the NEAC.
This part explains the "custom factory effect,"6 derived from the NEAC inte-
gration. This part also shows the current degree of regionalization of Northeast
Asia, by surveying the international transactions among the Northeast Asian
states and analyzing the economic effects, such as the intensity index of trade,
through formulae and statistics. Part IV explores the socio-political require-
ments for Northeast Asian countries to be able to integrate. This part seeks a
way to meet these requirements, namely a potential method for the establish-
ment of the NEAC. Then, this Note draws conclusions.
II. DEFINING THE NEAC UNDER GATT ARTICLE XXIV
A. Approach to a Definition of the NEAC
1. Factors in the Definition
Nowadays, when global security considerations have become less salient,
the causes of regional integration, unlike those of the Cold War period, are
mainly economic. Thus, the formation of the NEAC should focus on the eco-
nomic interests of the Northeast Asian countries. The NEAC, a Regional Trade
Association, should be regulated by GATT article XXIV, as an exception to the
Most Favored Nation principle (MFN), which is the main structure of the
World Trade Organization. In order to define the NEAC, while focusing on
economic interest and WTO rules, the present Northeast Asia situation and the
plausible degree of integration should also be considered. The empirical evi-
dence of the EU, especially the progress that its constituent communities are
making toward increasing integration, could act as a signal and direction for the
NEAC.
2. GATT article XXIV
RTAs, including Customs Unions (CUs) and Free-Trade Areas (FTAs) are
permitted only to the extent that they comply with the provisions of GATT
60. See Mulat, supra note 36, at 123-26.
Lyou, BYUNG-WOON
article XXIV, especially paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8.6 1 Paragraph 5 requires that the
level of tariffs and other commercial regulations in following integration not be
"on the whole" higher or more restrictive than "the general incidence" 62 of the
regulations prior to integration.63 Paragraph 5 also provides that any interim
agreement shall include a plan and schedule for the formation of an RTA within
a reasonable length of time."'
In paragraph 6, the procedure of GATT article XXVIII shall apply if a
member of the regional community (CU) proposes to increase any tariff rate in-
consistent with the state's schedules of concession according to GATT article
11.65 Paragraph 7 requires that any state deciding to enter into an RTA shall
promptly notify the members and shall make available to them information re-
garding their entry into that regional integration;6 that if it is not likely that a re-
gional community will be formed according to plan and schedule, the members
shall make recommendations to the party to enter into a regional integration;
67
and that any substantial change in the plan or schedule concerning the interim
agreement shall be communicated to the members.68 Paragraph 8 asks that
tariffs be eliminated with respect to "substantially all the trade" between or
among members with respect to substantially all the trade in products originat-
ing in such territories in the regional community.6
Until recently, GATT article XXIV has not regulated regional integration
well in a legal sense. Over fifty previous Working Parties on economic integra-
tion have been unable to reach unanimous conclusion as to an agreement for in-
tegration of GATT consistency, although no such agreement has been explicitly
disapproved.7" WTO members may approve regional integration by a two-
61. See XXIV Understanding, supra note 41, at 1161 paras. 1, 5.
62. Id. at para. 2. "The evaluation under paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV of the general inci-
dence of the duties and other regulations of commerce applicable before and after the formation
of a customs union shall in respect of duties and charges be based upon an overall assessment of
weighted average tariff rates and of customs duties collected." Id.
63. GATT 1947,supra note 41, at art. XXIV: 5.
64. XXIV Understanding, supra note 41, at 1162.
65. GATT 1947,supra note 41, at art. XXIV: 6.
66. Id. at art. XXIV: 7(a).
67. Id. at art. XXIV: 7(b).
68. Id. at art. XXIV: 7(c).
69. Id. at art. XXIV: 8.
70. GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 760 (6th ed. 1994).
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thirds majority, even if such integration does not fully comply with the require-
ments of GATT article XXIV.7" Furthermore, it is hard to say that GATT article
XXIV, paragraph 4 is legally binding.72 GATT article XXIV, however, should be
strictly interpreted because it is the exception to the main pillar of the WTO.
The purpose of GATT article XXIV is to permit regional integration with-
out unduly diluting the MFN principle.73 The XXIV Understanding 4 makes
the regulation of GATT article XXIV more concrete and distinct, for the Under-
standing strengthens the procedural aspects and substantial amplifications of the
rules. The compatibility of integration with GATT article XXIV should be ex-
amined by a Committee of Regional Trade Agreement (CRTA).75 The Under-
standing clarifies the procedures of "review," such as reports by a Working Party
and recommendations by the Council for Trade in Goods.76 Particularly, the
Understanding makes clear that WTO dispute settlement procedure may be in-
voked with respect to any matters arising from the application of GATT article
XXIV. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)77 also allows eco-
nomic integration,78 but requires that such integration "shall be designed to
facilitate trade between the parties to the agreement and shall not in respect of
any Member outside the agreement raise the overall level of barriers to trade in
services within the respective sectors or subsectors compared to the level appli-
cable prior to such an agreement."
79
a. Free Trade Areas
A free-trade area, is an agreement in which members remove trade barriers
among themselves but keep their separate national barriers against trade with
71. GATT 1947,supra note 41, at art. XXIV: 10.
72. "The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the
development .... They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area
should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade
of other contracting parties with such territories." Id. at art. XXIV: 4 (emphasis added) (the word
"recognize" does not imply legal obligation).
73. See GATT 1947, supra note 41, art. I, XXIV: 4.
74. XXIV Understanding, supra note 41, at 1161.
75. See HOEKMAN & KoSTECKI,supra note 43, at 352-55.
76. XXIV Understanding, supra note 41, at 1162, paras. 7-11.
77. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Apr. 15, 1994, in WTO Agreement,
Annex IB, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (1995).
78. Id. art. V: 1.
79. Id. art. V: 4.
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the outside world. In other words, an FTA is "a group of two or more customs
territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce ... are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constitu-
ent territories in products originating in such territories.""0 The European Free
Trade Area (EFTA), which was formed in 1960, is an example of a typical FTA.s l
In the 1950s, the United Kingdom was invited to participate in a series of confer-
ences to build a plan for European integration, but it continued to favor an inter-
governmental approach, such as EFTA, rather than a customs union. In point of
fact, the EFTA is only an FTA marked by certain loose forms of economic coop-
eration. 2 "The UK also sought to maintain its traditionally privileged relation-
ship with the US.""3 Another example of an FTA, which formally began at the
start of 1994, is the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA).
b. Customs Unions
In Customs Unions, members remove all trade barriers among themselves
and adopt a common set of external barriers. A CU is an association of nations
with duty free treatments for imports from members and a common level of ex-
ternal tariffs for imports from non-members.8 4 The European Economic Com-
munity (EEC), which existed from 1957 to 1992, was a CU that also included
some other agreements. Another example of a CU is the MERCOSUR, which
was formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in 1991.5
3. The Implications of the European Union Experience
From the processes of European integration, three important empirical les-
sons should be learned. One is that, as an early goal of integration, a CU was pre-
ferred to an FTA. Initially the United Kingdom "had chosen to remain outside
80. GATT 1947,supra note 41, art. XXIV: 8(b).
81. See PUGEL & LINDERT,SUpra note 16, at 214.
82. See The Stockholm Convention, Jan. 4, 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 3 (establishing the European
Free Trade Association, which includes seven nations: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.).
83. BERMANN ET AL.,Supra note 20, at 7.
84. See GATT 1947,supra note 41, art. XXIV: 8(a).
85. See PUGEL & LINDERT,SUpra note 16, at 214.
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the EEC, and had proposed instead a looser and wider free trade area."86 It was
not long before the United Kingdom changed its mind about becoming a mem-
ber of the EEC. Another lesson is learned, as a result of the mid 1960s tension be-
tween France and the EEC, that a supranational model of regional integration
was better than an intergovernmental model for the integration." In addition to
the tension just mentioned, the Luxembourg Compromise88 had a negative ef-
fect on the direction and pace of the European integration over the next two de-
cades.89 Finally, maintaining the some notion of sovereignty for states was
necessary, even though Charles De Gaulle's notion of absolute sovereignty was
not reasonable. This realization can be inferred from two facts. First, the major
laws and institutions of European integration are a product of international
agreements. In the processes of establishing treaties, including their signing and
ratification, the members' governments were obliged to arrange their domestic
system according to the integration process. 9 Second, "on May 27, 1952, a Euro-
pean Defense Community (EDC) Treaty was signed by all six ECSC coun-
tries."'" Such a hasty agreement, however, was aborted because France refused
to ratify the treaty. This fact implies that maintaining the military power of each
sovereign state is the Achilles's heel in the integration process.
86. CRAIG & DE B6RCA,supra note 19, at 14. See BERMANN ET AL.,Supra note 20, at 7.
87. The tension resulted from the change in the method of decision making at the Council of
Ministers from a unanimous vote, which had been required and was preferred by France, to a
qualified-majority vote. De Gaulle objected to the "federalist logic" of the change. See CRAIG & DE
BRCA,supra note 19, at 12-14.
88. Paradoxically, the Luxembourg Agreement revealed the disagreement between France and
the other five members. France urged unanimous agreement while the other five members ac-
cepted a majority vote on a proposal from the Commission. See id. at 13; 9 BULLETIN OF THE EUR.
COMMUNITIES 3 (1966).
89. From the time of the Luxembourg Compromise until the adoption of the Single European
Act in 1986, there was a move within the community from early supranationalism towards
greater intergovernmentalism. CRAIG & DE BRCA,supra note 19, at 15. The Single European Act
made the internal market integration more complete by revising the legislative process from
unanimous voting to qualified majority voting. SINCLE EUROPEAN ACT, June 29, 1987, O.J. (L 169)
6 (1987) [hereinafter SEA].
90. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 20, at 22.
91. Id. at 6.
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4. An Economic Approach to the Definition
There may be socio-cultural requirements that must be met before it is pos-
sible to move from one level of economic integration to the next, and that may
limit the integration process.92 So, an FTA may be more easily established than a
CU or another form of agreement that goes further. However, in this easier form
of integration (ErA), which does not have a redistribution mechanism, a mem-
ber could incur losses, even though the 'trade creation effect' are larger than the
'trade diversion effect' so that the region as a whole benefits. This potential prob-
lem causes some states to hesitate to integrate. The problem can be solved by the
establishment of a redistribution instrument on a supranational basis, and by the
creation of a "common market," which requires that the community, in addition
to having a CU, guarantee free movement of input factors, such as labor and
capital, as well as goods and services. By removing restrictive rules concerning
the migration of labor and capital, the EEC93 established a kind of common mar-
ket in early 1960s. 4 This guarantee of free movement of input factors is the best
policy for the restructuring of industries following integration. A common mar-
ket, of course, is a supranational structure.
5. The Levels of Regional Integration
A higher level of regional integration implies a higher level of economic
interdependence, communication, cultural homogeneity, and the capacity to
resolve conflicts. There are five levels of regionalization, 95 and they are meaning-
ful in evaluating the situation of Northeast Asia. The first level is a geographical
unit, for instance Northeast Asia. The second level concerns trans-local or trans-
92. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 211.
93. Article 2 of the EEC Treaty mandates the creation of a common market which pursues a
harmonious and continuous development of economic activities with stability. Article 3 addresses
the establishment of a common external tariff and commercial policy, the progressive elimination
of barriers to the free movement of the principal factors of production, the creation of a common
policy in agriculture, transport and competition areas, the coordination of economic and mone-
tary policy, and the harmonization of the member laws for the proper functioning of the common
market. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 3, 298
U.N.TS. II [hereinafter EEC].
94. See PUCEL & LINDERT,Supra note 16, at 214.
95. See Hettne, supra note 11, at 157-58.
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border relations of a socio-cultural and economic nature between human groups,
namely non-state actors. The first and second levels of regionalization are pre-
requisites for a regional community. The third level is inter-governmental, orga-
nized cooperation in cultural, economic, or military areas. This level is the
simplest basis for a regional community because the creation of a regional organi-
zation is a crucial step toward the community." The fourth level is regionally
shared civil society, which has an organizational framework that promotes com-
mon socio-political and economic policies. In such a society, the existence of a
shared cultural background throughout the region is important, but such a cul-
tural background must also be continuously reaffirmed.97 This level means a gen-
uine regional community. The fifth level is an acting global subject with a distinct
identity and governmental structure.
6. The Present Situation in Northeast Asia
a. The Limitation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation98
In the Bogor Declaration of 1994, the APEC declared that it would liberal-
ize trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2010 or 2020. It is cur-
rently implementing programs centered on the liberalization of trade and
investment and the facilitation of economic technical cooperation. However,
until now, with the advent of the APEC, there has been no real regional integra-
tion in Northeast Asia. Thus the characteristics of integration which are cur-
rently lacking in the Asia-Pacific are:
1) the institutional removal of domestic regulations to achieve a
common market guaranteeing the free movement of capital,
goods, services, and labor among member-states; 2) the develop-
96. See id. at 158.
97. See id.
98. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in 1989 in response to the
growing interdependence among Asia-Pacific economies. APEC began as an informal dialogue
group and has since become the regional forum, composed of twenty-one members, for promot-
ing open trade and practical economic cooperation. See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,
About APEC, at http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/aboutapec.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2004).
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ment of supranational organs99 as vehicles for decision-making
(qualified majority voting) on measures necessary to ensure the
functioning of that market; 3) a commitment to develop policies
to reduce regional imbalances and enhance socio-economic inte-
gration within and between members of the community.'
This lack of integration is to be expected, because the APEC is not a force for
true integration but a kind of loose intergovernmental form of co-operation.
°10
b. The Japan -Korea Free Trade Agreement and the East Asia Free Trade
Area
Korea and Japan have promoted a Free Trade Agreement, namely the
JKFTA.' °2 JKFTA could induce China, which was granted access to the WTO
in 2001, to participate in a regional community. China has promoted a Free
Trade Agreement in the form of ASEAN. °3 Also, the East Asian Free Trade
Area (EAFTA), which would be composed of the ASEAN countries along with
South Korea, China, and Japan, has been considered."
The 1997 East Asian financial crisis produced painful confirmation that the
region did not have a regional financial mechanism for the anticipation, preven-
tion, and management of such a crisis.' Presently, there is a strong movement
99. Though APEC has an emerging Secretariat in Singapore, currently there is not an institu-
tion functioning like the EU Commission. See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC Secre-
tariat, at http'//www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/about-apec/apec secretariat.html (last visited Mar. 18,
2004).
100. Higgott, supra note 13, at 47.
101. See id. at 44-45.
102. See JKFTA Joint Study, supra note 52.
103. On November 6, 2001, China and ASEAN agreed to establish an ASEAN-China FTA, the
7th ASEAN Summit, and the 5th ASEAN Plus Three Summit. See Bandar Seri Begawan, Press
Statement By the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the 5th ASEAN + 3 Summit (Nov. 5,2001),
available at http://www.aseansec.org/newdata/7thsummit-pr0l.htm (last visited Mar. 18,2004).
104. During the ASEAN Plus Three Summit, South Korea, China, and Japan agreed to estab-
lish a trilateral forum of economic ministers in an effort to strengthen economic cooperation
among the three countries. The ASEAN Plus Three Summit decided to consider the establish-
ment of the EAFTA. See id.
105. See Dobson, supra note 10, at 11. Before the crisis in East Asia, there were only two regional
financial cooperations. The first, the APEC Finance Ministers, which is not truly regional, deals
with social safety and capital flow. The second is the Executives' Meeting of East Asian and Pacific
Central Banks (EMEAP) which was organized by Japan and Australia in the early 1990s. See id.
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toward monetary integration,"6 and the ASEAN + 3 central bank governors
and finance ministers have agreed to work out arrangements for currency swap
among central banks. As a regional supplement system for the International
Monetary Fund, an East Asian Monetary Fund (EAMF) has been proposed."°7
According to the classification of levels of regional integration discussed
above, the Northeast Asian region today has moved from the third level of re-
gional integration to the forth level of regional integration. It is thus an oppor-
tune time to promote the NEAC.
B. A Legal Definition of the NEAC: The Regional Community
1. Overview
Based on the discussion thus far in this part, the NEAC, ideally should be a
genuine regional community, and should embrace three characteristics: con-
cerning economic integration, the NEAC should be supranational; concerning
political integration, the NEAC should have an intergovernmental cooperation
system like that of the intergovernmental conference (IGC) of the EU; concern-
ing sovereignty, the members maintain their status as sovereign states, even
though their sovereignty should be somewhat restricted. There, however, is a se-
rious question concerning the distinction between economic integration and po-
litical integration, as it relates to the NEAC. The proper answer to that question
can be gleaned from observing the EU integration.0 8 The extended scope of the
106. See generally Walden Bello, InvitingAnother Catastrophe, 162 FAR E. EcON. REV. 42 (Aug. 12,
1999), available at http://www.feer.com/cgi-bin/HSE/HSE.cgi (discussing the Asian efforts to-
ward economic reform and recovery). The Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) proposed by Japan just
after the 1997 financial crisis was faced with objection by the U.S. and the IMF. AMF would have
been capitalized to the tune of USDI00 billion from the reserves of Japan, China and Taiwan, but
the U.S. Treasury and the IMF were opposed to the idea because it would weaken the IMF. See id.
107. See Dobson, supra note 10, at 23; see also Ministry of Finance and Economy, Republic of
Korea, at http://www.mofe.go.kr/mofe2/html/mainindex.php3 (last visited Mar. 18, 2004). Korea
agreed to swap arrangements with Japan (USD 7 billion), China (USD 2 billion), Thailand (USD
I billion).
108. The three pillars of the EU legal system are: Community; Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP); and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (CJHA). In transition into the EU,
the EC added the latter two pillars to the community pillar. See CRAIG & DR B(JRCA,supra note 19,
at 30-46.
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basic treaty,'0 9 namely "the Community pillar," for establishing the NEAC can
be classified as "economic integration," the other, which is the common foreign
and security policy and the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,
as "political integration."
2. Maintaining the Members' Status as Sovereign States
A regional community sometimes sends a single, representative delegation
to discuss foreign affairs. For example, the EC participated in the Kennedy
Round of negotiation, which successfully reduced tariffs and other trade barri-
ers in 1967."' The EU (Brussels) also performed multilateral negotiations of the
Uruguay Round on behalf of the members of what was then the EC."' In partic-
ular, it took part in the procedure of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the
WTO as a single party."2 Moreover, the EU itself has a separate full membership
in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which is one of the United
Nations' specialized agencies." ' Thus while the EU members joined interna-
tional organizations such as the United Nations."4 under their state names and
performed unique activities within the organization, the members also acted
109. Under the Maastricht Treaty, policies regarding the free movement of persons, which in-
cludes visas, asylum, immigration, and judicial co-operation in civil matters previously covered by
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) were inserted into the body of the EC Treaty, namely "the Com-
munity pillar" by the Amsterdam treaty. See id. at 434.
110. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 20, at 8.
111. See Higgott, supra note 13, at 54.
112. "Where the European Communities exercise their right to vote, they shall have a number of
votes equal to the number of their member States which are Members of the WTO." WTO
Agreement, supra note 41, at art. IX para. 1. "[The European Communities] shall become original
Members of the WTO." Id. at art. XI para. 1.
113. The Conference may, by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast (provided that a majority of
the members is present) decide to admit as a member any regional economic integration organiza-
tion. See Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations,
Oct. 16, 1945, art. II para. 3, 12 U.S.T. 980, available at http://www.fao.org (last visited Mar. 18,
2004). To be eligible to apply for membership, a "regional economic integration organization must
be one constituted by sovereign States, a majority of which are Member Nations of the Organiza-
tion, and to which its Member States have transferred competence ... including the authority to
make decisions binding on its Member States." Id. at para. 4.
114. In 1974, the U.N. General Assembly gave the EU (then the EC), by Resolution, such right to
participate in the sessions and work of the General Assembly only in the capacity of observer. See
G.A. Res. 3208, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2266th plen. mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/L.734 (1974).
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collectively as a subject of international law by negotiating treaties in the name
of the EU. Thus the EU members remain independent states even though their
sovereignty is restricted by the EU."5 Even though there was a series of"histor-
ical, strategic and economic factors that [drove] and shaped this process, the
states [remained its] core."".6 It should be the same with the NEAC. However,
Northeast Asian countries have less experience with a supranational system and
more with the role of governments in interstate bargaining. So, the early NEAC
should gradually increase its control of members not only in the areas of eco-
nomic integration and policy arrangement, but also in the political area.
3. Substantial Socio-economic Integration
The NEAC should be a kind of regional community. In order to guarantee
the free flow of labor and capital and to get the full benefit of economies of scale,
which derive from economic integration, a supranational control mechanism
will be necessary. As the 1997 Asian financial crisis showed, there are many
regional economic problems, which are difficult for only one state to solve.
Furthermore, denationalization, which is increasing limitations on state sover-
eignty, is a typical characteristic of globalization. Thus if the NEAC, like the
EU, exercises its right as a regional community in international organizations,
such as the WTO, and takes part in the procedures of international DSB as a
single party, the results would be very efficient." 7 Therefore, the NEAC should
operate as a regional community, which means that there would be substantial
integration of its members, accompanied by a partial restriction of the sover-
eignty of its members. In order to form a genuine regional community, labor
forces, goods, capital, and services should be circulated without barriers between
members, which would gradually lead to complete economic and social integra-
tion. Accordingly, in order to form the NEAC into a genuine regional commu-
nity, it is necessary that it have the common market level of economic
integration.
115. A member organization may exercise votes equal to the number of its members on matters
within its competence. See Constitution of the FAO,supra note 113, at para. 10.
116. Higgott,supra note 13, at 48.
117. For an overview of the WTO decision-making procedures, see WTO Agreement, supra
note 41, at art. IX.
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4. Political Cooperation
The relation between the NEAC and its members will maintain their sov-
ereignty while it promotes political harmony and a common policy. For such a
system of political cooperation, at first, there will need to be meetings of the for-
eign ministers of the members, an intergovernmental forum for cooperation in
foreign policy, and the establishment of a permanent political secretariat, all of
which were recommended by the EC's Davignon Report in 1970."' s Then, like
the European Political Co-operation (EPC) system in 1973, a device for coordi-
nating foreign policy by intergovernmental methods,"9 the NEAC would speak
with one voice in international organizations in which its members participated.
Through such processes, just as the EPC has been upgraded to the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),' 20 a permanent Northeast Asian political
organization could be developed. In the early stages of the NEAC, a suprana-
tional mechanism would not have much meaning, for there would not be argu-
ments concerning qualified-majority voting and unanimous voting, because the
NEAC would need the agreement of three key states, Korea, China, and Japan.
III. THE ECONOMIC NEEED TO ESTABLISH THE NEAC
A. Gains from the Product Market
Increased gains from product markets result from removing internal tariffs.
These gains are the fruits of internal, freer trade. Ricardo's principle of compara-
tive advantage has been the theoretical basis for free trade since the nineteenth
century, regardless of its unreasonable premises, which are "one input" and "con-
stant opportunity cost." In the case of increasing opportunity cost, the parties of in-
ternational trade get the gains, but perfect specialization on each comparative
advantaged product would not take place. The gains from product markets can
be explained by the trade creation effect, which refers to the expansion of trade
with efficient suppliers inside a community. Economic integration, however,
could result in losses because external tariffs remain. These losses can be explained
118. See CRAIC & DEBTRCA,SUpra note 19, at 14-15.
119. See id. at 15; BERMANN ET AL., Supra note 20, at 922-23.
120. See Geoffery Edwards, Common Foreign and Security Policy: Incrementalism in Action?, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 3 (Martti Koskenniemi ed., 1998).
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by the trade diversion effect, which refers to a shift in trade from efficient suppli-
ers outside to inefficient suppliers inside the community. In short, the gains from
economic integration are tied to the trade creation effect, and the losses are tied to
the trade diversion effect. 12' Therefore, the net welfare effect, that is, the trade cre-
ation gain minus the trade diversion loss, could be positive or negative. Thus, eco-
nomic theory does not support economic integration in all circumstances. Still, as
mentioned in Part I, the EU accrued some definite net gains from the integra-
tion,122 which would tend to confirm the following analysis. 1
23
For the sake of analysis and simplification, the following assumptions
should be made. First, all supply curves are perfectly elastic. All cars are a like
product with same qualities in all respects. Second, the EU's tariff rate on for-
eign cars is i percent. And, before Spain's entry into the EU, its tariff rate on for-
eign cars was also i percent. Third, there are no tariffs for cars produced inside
the EU. In Figure 1, the Korean car supply curve in the international free trade
market is SKO. The Italian car supply curve in the international free trade mar-
ket is SIO. After the levying of tariffs by Spain or by the EU on Korean cars, the
supply curve shifts from SKO to SKI. The car demand curve of Spain is Ds; In
Spain, before levying tariffs, the price of Korean cars is USD 10,000, which is the
cheapest. The next cheapest substitute is an Italian car, priced at USD 10,300. Fi-
nally, the prices include export or import cost.
In Figure 1, point A indicates an imported car price and a quantity of cars in
Spain before its entry into the EU, having maintained its own tariffs. At that
time, the Spanish would buy only Korean cars at USD 11,000. So, Spain would
import 1,000 Korean cars and no Italian cars. Point A also indicates the price of
Korean cars in the EU market, and point B indicates the price of Italian cars in
the EU market. After Spain joins the EU, it removes tariffs on imports from EU
members, but not on imports from outside the EU. Thus, the Spanish no longer
buy Korean cars; they buy only Italian cars. Point C indicates the price of Korean
cars in international market. If there were free trade without any tariffs, Korea
121. Harry G. Johnson, The Economic Theory of Custom Union, in TRADING BLOCS: ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES TO ANALYZING PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 127-28 (Jagdish Bhagwati et al.
eds., 1999).
122. PUGEL & LINDERT, sUpra note 16, at 219-20.
123. See Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya, Preferential Trading Area and Multilateralism-
Strangers, Friends, or Foes, in TRADING BLOCS: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ANALYZING PREFEREN-
TIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, Supra note 121, at 42-47; PUGEL & LINDERT, supra note 16, at 216-18.
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Figure 1: Hypothetical Market for Cars in Spain
could export 2,500 cars to Spain. The move from A to B creates 1,000 additional
imports, which brings national welfare gains (area e), increasing consumers' sur-
plus for Spain. However, it also diverts those 1,000 cars from the cheapest out-
side suppliers to the next cheapest suppliers of the members, bringing national
welfare losses (area c), 124 decreasing tariff revenues of Spain. (Before Spain's
entry into the EU, area a was the consumers' surplus; area b + c was tariff reve-
nues; and area e + f + g was the "nation loss triangle" which is the net loss of con-
sumers' surplus due to the levying of tariffs.) Thus, Trade Creation Effect (area
e) = A x (11,000 - 10,300) x (2,000 - 1,000) = $350,000: national welfare gains >
Trade Diversion Effect (area c) = (10,300 - 10,000) x 1,000 = $300,000: national
welfare losses.
The above analysis, however, should be modified because supplies are not
perfectly elastic and because cost is not constant. In a more realistic model, the
supply curves slope upward. In such a model, the trade diversion effect implies
two additional consequences. First, the shift from suppliers outside the eco-
nomic community to the inside suppliers makes the outside supply prices fall. It
124. See Johnson,supra note 121, at 134- 35;seealso Pugel & LINDERT,SUpra note 16, at 216-18.
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improves members' "terms of trade"'25 , which reduces the welfare losses from
the trade diversion. So, the total welfare improvement of the economic commu-
nity will occur at the expense of outsiders. Second, the shift from the suppliers
outside the economic community to the inside suppliers causes the price of the
inside supply to rise. Consequently, it reduces the consumer's surplus. However,
it may increase the inside suppliers' surplus, which means that there is merely a
shift of welfare from one member to another. 6 Moreover, the net increase in
product cost also will be distributed as wages, rent, interest, and profits inside
the community. Given the social cost of unemployment, there is another gain in
that product cost area. These two additional consequences of the trade diversion
effect have two important implications. One is that the trade diversion effect is
exaggerated in the above analysis. The other is that economic integration can
bring a shift of welfare from one member to another as well as from outside to
inside the community, which means that a member can incur losses, even
though the trade creation effects are larger than the trade diversion effects, so
that the economic community as a whole reaps welfare gains. Such a situation
may make some states hesitant to cooperate with the economic integration.
Therefore, a redistribution system, such as the EU's various structural funds and
the CAP is necessary, even though the system would reduce the welfare of the
economic community as a whole.'27 The following hypothetical situations make
the point clear.
Through all of these situations, among the outside suppliers of Spain, the
Korean supplier is the most efficient, and the Italian supplier the next most effi-
cient. The supplier gets a supplier's surplus at the rate of USD 1000/car. In Situ-
ation I, Spain keeps its own tariffs (USD 1,000/car) without joining the EU or
another FTA. In this situation, Spain imports 1,000 cars from Korea, and 500
cars from Italy. As a result of such trade, each country gets a welfare increase:
Spain gets USD 4.5 million, if the consumer's surplus is USD 3 million (tariff
revenue equals 1.5 million, consumer's surplus equals 3 million); Korea gets
125. 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMics 623-26 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987)
(defining "terms of trade" as the ratio between the price of a country's export goods and the price
of its import goods, namely the opportunity costs of export goods expressed by import goods).
126. See Johnson, supra note 121, at 135-36.
127. See Padoan, supra note 56, at 115. In the necessity of redistribution systems, governments of
members in the community tend to forge international institutions in order to meet various func-
tional needs.
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Situation I Situation 2
Situation 3 Situation 4
Italy
(million USD)
4.5 0.5 4.0 1.6
Spain
Figure 2: Hypothetical Matrix
USD I million (supplier's surplus); Italy gets USD 0.5 million (supplier's sur-
plus). In Situation II, Spain joins the EU, which does not have any redistribution
system. The tariff rate of the EU is also USD 1,000/car. In this situation, given
the trade creation and the trade diversion effects, Spain imports 400 cars from
Korea, and 1600 cars from Italy. Through this trade, each country gets a welfare
increase: Spain gets USD 4.0 million, if the consumer's surplus is USD 3.6 mil-
lion (tariff revenue: 0.4 million; consumer's surplus: 3.6 million); Korea gets
USD 0.4 million (supplier's surplus); Italy gets USD 1.6 million (supplier's sur-
plus). In Situation III, a FTA is established between Spain and Korea. Spain
keeps its own tariff, which is ten percent against any other country. In this situ-
ation, because of trade effects and efficiency, Spain imports 1,800 cars from
Korea and 300 cars from Italy. Through such trade, each country gets a welfare
increase: Spain gets USD 4.3 million if the consumer's surplus is USD 4.0 million
(tariff revenue: 0.3 million; consumer's surplus: 4.0 million); Korea gets USD 1.8
million (supplier's surplus); Italy gets USD 0.3 million (supplier's surplus). In
Situation IV, Spain joins the EU, which has a redistribution system. In this situ-
ation, the EU can distribute part of Italy's net gain (USD 1. 1 million) to Spain. If
the net gain is divided equally between Spain and Italy, the increase of welfare in
the Situation II will be changed as follows; Spain gets USD 4.55 million; Korea
gets USD 0.5 million; and Italy gets USD 1.05 million. These situations can be
described through the matrix in Figure 2. Spain does not want the integration of
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Situation II, which is in the upper-right of the box in Figure 2. Spain, however,
will certainly enter the EU, if such entry will give it an increase of welfare, as in
Situation IV (see lower-right of the box in Figure 2).
Thus, analysis of the above hypothetical matrix reveals the necessity of es-
tablishing a regional system which can manage welfare distribution.'28 Such a
welfare distribution system can also develop policies that will reduce regional
imbalances and enhance socio-economic integration among the members of the
community.
B. Gains from the Product Market'29
The H-O theory also supports free trade. Ricardian theory suggests that com-
parative advantage is derived from the difference in product costs, even though
Ricardo does not explain the causes of the difference. The H-O theory does ex-
plain the difference of factor endowment and the difference in factor intensive-
ness as the cause of the difference in product costs. Accordingly, trade occurs as a
result of "differences in the availability of factor inputs in different countries and
differences in the proportions in which these factors are used in producing differ-
ent products."'3 ° H-O theory stresses factor proportion. In this theory, the factor-
price equalization theorem implies that free trade will equalize not only product
prices but also the prices of input factors between countries even if such factors
cannot move between countries. 3' Through free trade, laborers will eventually
get the same wages in every country if they have homogeneous quality, even
though laborers' migration between countries is not permitted.'32 The equaliza-
128. The best form of regional integration is likely to exist when: the distributive means among
members is comparatively stable; and members expect no change in this distribution. See Joseph
M. Grieco, Systematic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East
Asia, and the Americas, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONALISM, supra note 26, at 174, 176. See
generally Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newer
Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485, 485-95 (1988) (describing the conflict between realists
and neo-liberal institutionalists and setting forth the beliefs of the respective schools of thought
and the differences between them).
129. Gain from the product market and gain from the input market overlap in many respects.
130. PUCEL & LINDERT, supra note 16 , at 61.
131. "A shift in relative product prices brings an even more magnified response in factor prices."
Id. at 67.
132. In the real world, factor prices would not fully equalize among countries that constitute a
FTA or a CU. The H-O theory implies that there appear to be tendencies toward equalization. See
id. at 75.
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tion of factor prices requires a process of specialization on abundant factors. Such
specialization implies increased efficiency and economies of scale. Equalization of
factor prices brings an optimum allocation of factors among countries on the
whole. The increased efficiency, the economies of scale, and the optimum alloca-
tion of factors cause the rate of increasing opportunity cost to slow down, which
means that the production-possibility curve becomes more elastic and approaches
the linear curve that is the basis for Ricardo's principle of comparative advantage.
In short, "the more a factor is specialized, or concentrated, into the production of
exports, the more it stands to gain from trade."'33 In the H-O approach, gains can
be achieved through free trade without movement of factors, even though the
theory requires the premises that each state has different plentiful factors and that
these factors are homogenous.
Concerning an economic community, the H-O theory implies several
things. First, it implies that the specialization on abundant factors, which means
the rearranging of an industry,'34 requires the sacrifice of sectors which use un-
selected factors. Which factors should be chosen? Who gets the fruit? These are
very difficult questions to answer in a short time. Such a difficulty is one of the
reasons that many barriers against free trade still remain, though every state
knows that free trade is no longer a zero-sum game. Thus, "market integration
[may] highlight disparities in regional wealth."'3 5 To ease such sacrifice, a path of
retreat, or a kind of subsidy or traditional foreign aid program would be neces-
sary. The EU has the redistribution mechanism of resources through the struc-
tural funds as well as Cohesion funds.3 6 The guarantee of free movement of
factors would thus be one of the best policies. Second, economic integration may
bring about more widespread and effective competition between firms and in-
dustries, and such competition would eliminate monopolistic distortions,'
37
whereas economies of scale, which are derived from the specialization on abun-
dant factors, can result in monopoly. Thus, a policy of competition, such as that
of the EU, is necessary to keep the fruit of economies of scale by means of the
133. Id. at 67.
134. There will be expansion in the export-oriented sector whereas there will be contraction in
the import-competing sector. See id. at 73-75.
135. William J. Davey, European Integration: Reflections on Its Limits and Effects, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 185, 192 (1993).
136. See Padoan, supra note 56, at 115.
137. See Johnson, supra note 121, at 138.
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regulation of monopoly. Third, if a community guarantees free movement
factors as well as free trade, it more easily and directly benefits from the effect of
H-O. In Figure 3, the area (a + b + c + d) describes the gain (a + b: gain from
product market, c + d: gain from input market), which would be derived from
the integration of markets between China and Japan.'38 A high-wage country
could gain (area c) by employing more immigrant labor from a low-wage coun-
try, and a low-wage country could gain (area d) by exporting more of its labor to
employers in a high-wage country. Particularly considering the large differences
in wages among prospective members of the NEAC, the countries would
achieve the net gains from free movement of labor (the gains from free move-
ment of labor minus the costs of removing barriers against free movement of la-
bor). It means that efficiency in the inputs market also demands allowing inputs
to move freely to the country where the inputs get the highest return, namely
whose marginal product of inputs is highest, as free trade allows the high-price
country to import the goods at a price less than what it would cost to produce the
goods at home, and the low-price country to export the goods and receive a
higher price than that of the domestic market.
In Figure 3, between the area (a + b: gain from product market) and the area
(c + d: gain from inputs market), which one is larger? It is arguable and depends
on various conditions. A study shows that the area (c + d) is larger than the area
(a + b), which means that the gains from removing barriers against the free
movement of inputs, especially labor, could be great, and could far exceeding the
gains from removing trade barriers.'39 However, in the real world, the two sorts
of gain, gain from product market and gain from input market, largely overlap
each other. In the input market in Figure 3, the gap (w4-w2) implies the cost of
movement or of homogenizing factors. The smaller the gap, the freer the move-
ment of the factors or the more homogeneous the factors. 14° The H-O theory also
138. For the purposes of this analysis, assume that the NEAC is composed only of Japan and
China.
139. According to Hamilton and Whalley, the gains from free movement of labor would more
than double worldwide real income as well as improve the equality in income distribution. Bob
Hamilton & John Whalley, Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Global Restrictions on La-
bour Mobility, 14 J. DEv. EcON. 61, 70-74 (1984).
140. By the end of 1996, there were about 77,000 Chinese Koreans who wanted to make quick
money by working in South Korea and more than half of them were illegal. In such a situation,
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implies that the homogeneity of factors is a very important requirement for re-
gional integration itself and for realizsing the effects of H-O. In fact, regional in-
tegration is a process of change from relative heterogeneity to increased social
homogeneity.
C. Advantages of Integration
1. Integrated Region v. Disintegrated Region
In order to analyze and simplify the comparison between an integrated re-
gion and a disintegrated region, the following situation could be imagined. There
are two regions, A and B, in the world. The trade creation effect = 2; the trade di-
version effect = -1. This premise is based on the above analysis (Part III.A) and the
empirical evidence of the EU (Part II). Moreover, regional integration provides a
dynamic synergistic effect as well as opportunities derived from the enhancement
of market access. 4' The increase ofa supplier's surplus inside a community = 1.5.
The decrease of the supplier's surplus outside the community = - 1.5. In Figure 1,
given that the supply curves (SKO') slope upward, the decrease of the supplier's
surplus outside the community can be described as area (d). An argument can be
made that it is always possible to form a regional community in such a way that
the members are better off without any outside countries worse off.' This argu-
ment, however, does not consider the fact that the economic integration in ad-
vance of time has market power, which is derived from improvement of the terms
commission and other fees. The commission and fees constituted a part of the "opportunity cost"
for getting the higher wages. These "recruiters," however, disappeared as soon as they collected
the money. The total loss to the Chinese-Korean community is estimated at about USD 30 mil-
lion. Such losses imply a kind of social cost which is derived from the gap (w4 - w 2). See Zhao,
supra note 24, at 143.
141. See JSEPA Study Group, supra note 44, at §§1-2. The dynamic synergy effects (e.g., acceler-
ating the restructuring industries and industrial cooperation) brought about by increased compe-
tition and corporate alliance lead to the trade-creation effect once more. See Institute of
Developing Economies: Japan External Trade Organization, Toward Closer Japan-Korea Eco-
nomic Relations in the 21st Century (Summary Report) 19-22 (March 2000), available at http'//
www.ide.go.jp (last visited Mar. 21, 2004).
142. According to this argument, the common external tariffs of the community make members
trade with non-members under the same level of pre-integration. Another suggestion is that there
is an incentive to integrate and extend the community until the world i$ integrated into one com-
munity. See Murray C. Kemp & Henry Y. Wan, Jr., An Elementary Proposition Concerning the For-
mation of Customs Unions, 6 J. INT'L EcoN. 95, 95-96 (1976).
Lyou, BYUNG-WOON
A and B both form an economic community A forms economic an community, B doesn't
B forms an economic community, A doesn't A and B together don't form an community
A region
(welfare)




Figure 4: Hypothetical Matrix
of trade and efficiency. Furthermore, economic integration requires a process of
difficult bargaining.143 Such an argument implies that an economic community
can achieve a net gain by adjusting its external tariffs; the argument supports the
analysis above. 44 Another argument suggests that an economic community can
impose an optimal external tariff, because it is bigger than its members and thus
enjoys greater market power.145 It might seem that, in some cases, a monopoly
company can reduce the price of its goods by using economies of scale. On the con-
trary, however, an economic community can be abused, even though GATT article
XXIV regulates it.1 46 When both A and B together do not form an economic com-
munity, each region gets 5 as an initial gain.
143. See Stephan Haggard, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Asia and the Americas, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONALISM,supra note 26, at 25-26.
144. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 466.
145. See Kenneth A. Froot & David B. Yoffie, Trading Blocs and the Incentives to Protect: Implica-
tionsfor Japan and East Asia, in REGIONALISM AND RIVALRY: JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN PA-
CIFIC ASIA 125, 136 (Jeffrey A. Frankel & Miles Kahler eds., 1993).
146. Rules of origin and subsidization of industry could be used for the protectionist's purpose.
The rules of origin in the EU are related to the industrial strategy. See Jeri Jensen-Moran, Choice
at the Crossroads: Regionalism and Rules of Origin, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 981, 983-84 (1996);
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Regional Trade Agreements and the
Multilateral Trading System, TD/TC(2002)8/FINAL, at 142-43 paras. 472-74 (Nov. 20, 2002), at
http://www.olis.oecd.org. With the competitive pressure on EU industries, the EU is likely to in-
crease restrictive measures against imports from outside, which seem to be protectionist. See
Davey, supra note 135, at 212-13.
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Word Economy Contribution Figure 5: Major Region's
Contribution to the Global
Economy1 47
% 20' SWI
0 uNEA NAFTA EU Other
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Itra-regional Trade Ratio Figure 6: Intra-Regional
Trade Ratio14
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In Figure 4, I created a hypothetical matrix according to the above premises.
It says that the upper-left of box (in the situation, A and B both form an eco-
nomic community) is reasonable and fair.
147. The NEA includes South Korea, China (excluding Hong Kong and Macao), and Japan.
FDI Statistics are from 1999. IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 2001 (June) available at
http://www.imf.org.
148. Intra-regional Trade Ratio = (Internal trade among states in the region / Total trade of states
in the region) ¥#100. The table will show intra-regional trade and total trade in Northeast Asia, in
NAFTA, and in EU (1998-2000). IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (2000), available at http://
www.imf.org.
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2. The NEAC v. the United States (NAFTA) or the European Union
RTAs have flourished in the current world, particularly during the last de-
cade. In particular, the advent of the NAFTA, which set the stage for a North
American economic region, and the EU, forced the Northeast Asia countries to
think of themselves as a region distinct from North America and Europe.
As Figure 5 shows, among the economically important regions, the North-
east Asian region is the only one that has not yet formed an integrated economic
community.
The intra-regional trade ratios in Figure 6 illustrates two processes. First,
the intra-regional trade ratio of Northeast Asia shows more of an increase in in-
ternal trade than in external trade. It also shows deepening trade regionalization
in Northeast Asia, which is one of the requirements for regional integration. In
order to acquire a more objective basis for trade regionalization, the so-called
"double-relative,"'4 9 which is the intra-regional trade ratio, taking into account
the increasing weight of the Northeast Asian region in world trade, can be cal-
culated. The double-relative of Northeast Asia in 1998 was 1.316; that in 2000
was 1.357. It shows that trade regionalization increased distinctly from 1.316 to
1.357 in only two years. Second, the intra-regional trade ratios of the EU and
NAFTA are very high. Especially in the EU, over 60 percent of trade is internal
trade. This fact implies deepening competition or a narrowing trade market in
the world, as well as a strong trade effect (net gains) from regional integration. 50
Since the intra-regional trade ratio of the EU in 1980 was 42 percent,' trade re-
gionalization has been accomplished significantly.
149. Double-relative of Northeast Asia (DRNEA) = Intra-regional trade ratio/Ratio of regional
trade weight in world trade = lIntra-regional trade (TNEA) / Total trade of the region (Tt)} / ITo-
tal trade of the region (Tt) / World total trade (Tw). Jeffrey A. Frankel, Is Japan Creating a Yen
Bloc in East Asia and the Pacific?, in REGIONALISM AND RIVALRY: JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN
PACIFIC AsIA, supra note 145, at 54-56.
150. As a result of growing regional integration, intra-regional trade "has increased from 40% of
total world trade in the period 1988-1992 to 42% in the period 1993-1997 .... Western Hemi-
sphere trade agreements, such as NAFTA and MERCOSUR,... showed more significant
growth in the share of [intra-regional] trade, from 19% in the period 1988-1992 to 27% in the pe-
riod 1993-1997." WTO Staff Paper, Preferential and Non-preferential Trade Flows in the World 1-2
(Sept. 1998), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/singapore/sectionl.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 22, 2004); JSEPA Study Group, supra note 44, at §1-4.





























2,035 1,253 2,607 2,784
6,985 7,758 7,791 n.a.
Table 2: Major FDI Flowing in Northeast Asia'
In Table 1, the trade matrix of Northeast Asian countries'54 shows vigorous
trade in the region. In Table 2, the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows in
Northeast Asia, which indicate a steady increase in total new investment, show-
152. Korea International Trade Association, at http://kotis.kita.net/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2004).
153. The Export-Import Bank of Korea, Korea Government, Ministry of Commerce, Industry
and Energy, at http://www.mofat.go.kr; 2002 JETRO White Paper on International Trade and
Investment (Summary) 18, at http://www.jetro.go.jp/it/e/pub/whitepaper/2002/1-a.html. There is
a little difference between the Korean and the Japanese statistics.
154. Table 1 shows an imbalance in Korea-Japan trade (Korea's excess of imports), which has
been a chronic problem between the two countries. After formation of JKFTA, a rapid increase of
imports from Japan to Korea would create a greater trade imbalance than what currently exists.










ing an increasing interdependence among Northeast Asian countries. 155 In
short, given rapid economic growth, intra-regional trade and investment rates
in the Northeast Asia have increased greatly, which fosters regional economic
interdependence. Therefore, in order to further trade and investment regional-
ization, and the resultant economic interdependence among the Northeast
Asian countries, the NEAC should be established.
D. The Necessity of Regional Financial Arrangements
The Asian financial crisis of 1997, which revealed the weaknesses in entities
of the international financial system such as the IMF and the World Bank, shows
the necessity of regional financial arrangements.'56 The existing international fi-
nancial system, especially the IMF, failed to provide the countries in crisis with
rapid aid at a time great need and with adequate prescriptions.157 Regional finan-
cial arrangements could bring the following benefits: reduction of vulnerability to
in the criterion of foreign exchange holdings. If both countries form an FTA, as is now being pro-
moted, Korea's excess of imports would be deepened in spite of the gain from integration. In such
a situation, the increase in Japanese exports to Korea (16.30%) would surpass the increase of
Korean exports (8.30%) to increase trade surplus by 34.5%. Institute of Developing Economies,
supra note 141, at 27. Such high imports may cause Korea to hesitate in embracing the integration.
The fundamental solution to this problem would be a "common market" that guarantees factor
movement. Given the current situation, a more realistic answer would first take account of Ja-
pan's more preferential tariff rate and the proffered "reasonable time" requirement. GATT 1947,
supra note 41, at art. 1: 2, 4, art. XXIV: 5. Second, it would extend the opportunity of Korean com-
panies to Japanese public procurement. Id. at art. III: 8(a), art. IV.
155. Stock of intra-regional investment is also increasing. See, e.g., JETRO, White Paper on For-
eign Direct Investment (Japan External Trade Organization), at tbls. 14 & 19, at httpi/
www.jetro.go.jp/ it/e/pub/whitepaper/invest2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2004) (explaining that
at the end of 1998, Japan's outward stock of direct investment to China, including Hong Kong,
was USD 27.1 billion, and Japan's inward stock of direct investment from Chinese Taipei and
Hong Kong was USD 2.1 billion).
156. See Dobson, supra note 10, at 20-21.
157. For example, the Korean situation was different from that of the others and was important
because its economy is the eleventh largest in the world. At the time, the Korean economy was
going well: real GDP grew at about 8 percent per year up to the crisis, just as it had in the 1980s.
Korea got into difficulties in mid-1997 because its newly licensed financial institutions had in-
curred short-term foreign debts. Since Korea's total foreign debt was only about 30 percent of
GDP, which is the lowest level among developing countries, it was a temporary liquidity problem;
so, the IMF should not have used its traditional policies, such as reduced government spending,
higher taxes, and tight credit. See Martin Feldstein, Refocusing the IMF, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 20-33
(Mar./Apr. 1998); PUGEL & LINDERT, supra note 16, at 609.
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capital flow and exchange rate instability; rapid aid according to a possibly bad re-
gional situation;' 58 and assistance to its members through surveillance or through
closer macroeconomic cooperation and technical support. Furthermore it can give
early warnings of possible future crises and can work as self-help toward cooper-
ative management of crises.'59 To realize such benefits from monetary integration,
members must have similar macroeconomic policy objectives.
IV. SOCIO-POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR NEAC INTEGRATION
A. The Issue
Socio-politically, the NEAC integration needs to meet the general require-
ments' 60 of regional integration and the special requirements for NEAC. What
are the requirements and how can the NEAC meet these requirements?
B. General Requirements
1. Communications and Transactions
Regional integration takes place in the sphere of communications and trans-
actions among the prospective members, who hope that the communication and
transactions will be kept open as much as possible. The increased institutionaliza-
tion of the EU supports the functional argument that institutions in a region are
more likely to form when the regional economic interactions increase.'6 ' Unlike
members of the EU, the Northeast Asian peoples did not develop considerable
communication and transactions, even though there were only minimum diplo-
matic interchanges between governments or a small-scale unofficial relationship
in the frontier areas."' Furthermore, over the last half-century, the Northeast
Asian countries had a complicated and hostile history. The region was wracked by
World War II, the Korean War, and the all-embracing Cold War. For these
158. Dobson, supra note 10, at 19 ("[S]ubstantial infrastructure is required to strengthen the re-
gion's ability to intermediate savings more efficiently.").
159. Id.
160. Lang, supra note 12, at 50.
161. Mansfield & Milner, supra note 26, at 8.
162. See generally Zhao, supra note 24, at 134 (detailing the relations between governments).
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reasons, the region has not been integrated up to the present. In contrast, today, as
Table 1 shows, vigorous trade has taken place among the countries. Moreover, as
Figure 6 shows, there has been deepening trade regionalization which means
more internal trade and less external trade in the region. 63 Similarly, FDI has also
been increasingly regionalized . 64 Table 2 notes the FDI flowing for totally new
investment in Northeast Asia, and shows increasing interdependence among
Northeast Asia countries. The leading economies, Japan, Taiwan, and South
Korea, were major investors in China. Stock of direct investment is also increas-
ing. 61 In short, the region is becoming increasingly interdependent, measured in
terms of both trade and capital flows."6 Such interdependence drives economic
growth, and with trade and investment, cultural and personnel exchanges are also
taking place among the Northeast Asian countries. Especially in 1998, Korea and
Japan, by recognizing that the basis of cooperation lies in deep mutual under-
standing and exchange, agreed to promote cultural and personnel exchanges.
167
Korea and Japan co-hosted successfully the 2002 FIFA World Cup which actively
promoted exchanges in culture and sports.
68
2. Regional Identity
Regional identity is a kind of psychological factor, a feeling of togetherness
with respect to common geographical and historical matters, which forms the
basis for regional integration.169 The question concerning regional identity is
163. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK 61-62 (1992) (noting the
rapid increase in intraregional trade in East Asia).
164. See Mitchell Bernard & John Ravenhill, Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese: Regionaliza-
tion, Hierarchy, and the Industrialization of East Asia, 47 WORLD POL. 171, 179-83 (Jan. 1995) (noting
that the wave of Japanese FDI that swept through the Northeast Asian region combined with the
later wave of Taiwan, Korean, and Singaporean FDI, has fostered the growth of a large number
of production networks throughout the region that have served to knit the region together).
165. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
166. See MICHEL OKSENBERG & ELIZABETH ECONOMY, SHAPING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS: A LONG-
TERM STRATEGY 45-46 (1997).
167. See Joint Declaration on a New R.O.K.-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century, available at
http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat (Oct. 8, 1998) (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
168. Id. See Official Site of The 2002 FIFA World Cup, 2002 FIFA World Cup: Korea Japan, at
http://fifaworldcup.yahoo.com/02/en/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
169. See Teija Tiilikanen, Does Europe Need a Common Identity? A Comment upon the Core Prob-
lems of the CFSP, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 120, at 21
(examining the EU from this perspective).
BUILDING THE NEAC
whether the development of a regional identity, or at least a "shared awareness
of region" among the prospective members, should be developing along with, or
prior to regional integration. There are two attitudes concerning this question.
One is that regional identity becomes an important factor for regional integra-
tion. 7' The other attitude is that a regional integration needs to be extended to a
wider, multi-actor dimension, and globalized circumstances. In pursuit of max-
imizing rational utility, the identity of region could be secondary. 7' This atti-
tude has become more persuasive with the rapid progress of information and
communication technology, and argues that regional identity can arise "even in
the absence of some geographical and historical indicators of expected 'region-
ness."" 72 The APEC, for instance, may be a proof that regional identity is no
longer an important factor for regional integration. Generally, however, the
identity of a region is a factor in inter-regional relations, and regions can be cog-
nitively identified in the same way that they can be historically or geographically
determined. Of course, among the APEC members, there is as yet no combined
objective comparable to that of the 'European Identity,"73 which members can
use for deepening the integration. Even in the EU, there is an identity crisis.'
74
Thus, identity would be the basis of interests.' 75
Even though the Chinese Character culture, Confucianism, and Mahayana
Buddhism influenced all of Northeast Asia considerably and a recognition of
"regionness" has gradually formed, there is a historical legacy of mistrust among
Northeast Asian peoples. The Japanese from time to time have made the Kore-
ans and the Chinese angry, and deepened their chagrin by the adulation of
World War I criminals, 176 the justification of past agression and colonization of
170. See Kupchan, supra note 28, at 211.
171. See Higgott, supra note 13, at 46.
172. Id.
173. See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1 art. B (Treaty of Maastrict)
("[T]o assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a
common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy,
which might in time lead to a common defence.") (emphasis added).
174. See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 445 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (1992); Tiilikanen, supra note 169, at 19
("[Tihere is no such identity in the European Union and that this [sic] is the main obstacle to the
construction of a real common foreign and security policy.").
175. See id. at 21; East Asia Vision Group Report 2001, supra note 31, at 8, para. 13.
176. See Rebecca MacKinnon, Japan's Prime Minister Visits a War Shrine, Aug. 13, 2001,at http.//
www.cnn.com/ (describing China and Korea's angry reactions to Japanese Prime Minister
Koizumito's visit to Yasukuni shrine, which commemorates convicted World War II criminals).
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neighboring countries, and distortion of history textbooks. 177 Japan needs to un-
derstand the nature of the region, where remembrance of the past is stronger
than in the West, and where ethics and feelings may be considered more impor-
tant than economic benefits. For example, Korea, who has been continuously in-
vaded by neighboring powers in the past, has a traditional suspicion of external
powers. 178 Thus, many Koreans seem to believe that Japan is a threat to Korea,
179
and that the Japanese do not want Korea to be prosperous. 8 ' In order for North-
east Asian countries to have a feeling of togetherness, self-confidence and an un-
derstanding of each other are the most necessary factors in the NEAC
integration. "Identity is real, but is made and remade."'
8
'1
3. A Certain Level of Economic Development
The level of economic development of prospective members is a significant
factor, because the leveling of differences among the members principally in-
creases integration costs, which can be compensated by the various funds.
Within the EU, problems have arisen because of the varying development levels
among the members.8 2 The JSEPA could easily enable Japan and Singapore to
develop new opportunities for moving ahead from the rapid development of in-
formation and communications technology, because both countries are among
the more developed economies in Asia, and are at similar levels of economic de-
velopment.8 3 The development gap, however, does not really jeopardize the
177. See Japan Stands Firm Over History Textbook, May 17, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/ ("Ja-
pan's firm stance on not revising its history textbooks continues to annoy China and South Korea,
which maintain that the facts on wartime atrocities should be corrected.").
178. See Donald P. Gregg, The Two Koreas and Northeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era, in THE
Two KOREAS AND THE UNITED STATES, supra note 24, at 169, 172.
179. See Okonogi, supra note 55, at 129 ("[T]here have been instances such as the 1991-92 R.O.K.
Defense White Paper in which Japan was treated as a hypothetical enemy.").
180. For example, many Koreans believe that the Japanese would be against unification of the
two Koreas because they do not like the possibility of a new threat. In reality, most Japanese people
do not have such concrete thoughts about the issue. If they do, it would be a vague apprehension
about the immense uncertainty in the process of unification. See id. at 127-29.
181. Davydd J. Greenwood, Cultural Identities and Global Political Economyfrom an Anthropolog-
ical Vantage Point, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 101, 115 (1993).
182. Davey, supra note 135, at 200-01.
183. The 1998 GNP per capita of Japan ranked fifth; that of Singapore ranked sixth in the world.
JSEPA Study Group, supra note 44.
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process of integration if there is strong regional identity and a necessity of inte-





In order to form a regional integration, there must be powerful civil institu-
tions that push the integration as one of their goals.'86 Concerning regional inte-
gration, institutions promotes economic integration and put into effect the
integrating rules which are adopted by basic treaty in the processes of integra-
tion.'87 Institution building creates a way of dependence among members and a
vested interest in integration. Institutions also provide a kind of social cement
that mitigates self-interest and opportunism.'88 Institutional building within a
region depends on the preferences and bargaining power of members.'89 "The
lack of a regional mechanism for intergovernmental dialogue and cooperation
has been a distinctive feature of East Asian international relations."'190
5. External Economic and Political Environment
The WTO-centered MFN trade liberalization could be evaluated as a better
way than the NEAC, 9' because a regional economic community has an innate ex-
clusiveness which may conflict with the interests of non-members.' 92 However,
184. See Davey, supra note 135, at 200-01. In 1999, in Berlin, the EU Council decided to make a
fund to support ISPA, SAPARD, and new members that would join the EU during 2002-2006.
Enormous investment is required for the applicant countries, such as Eastern European countries.
See Council Regulation 1267/99 art. 3,1999 O.J. (L. 161); Council Regulation 1268/1999 art. 8, 1999
O.J. (L. 161).
185. See discussion on institutionalization infra part IV.D.2.
186. See Davey, supra note 135, at 198-99.
187. See id.
188. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 36-37 (1981).
189. See Haggard,supra note 143, at 31-48.
190. EAST AsiA, supra note 1, at 7.
191. Bhagwati & Panagariya, supra note 123, at 35.
192. See Cho, supra note 33, at 420. Forming RTAs in which tariffs do not satisfy MFN may un-
dermine a multilateral system. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Will PreferentialAgreements Un-
dermine the Multilateral Trading System?, in TRADING BLOCS: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO
ANALYZING PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 121, at 505-21.
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non-hegemonic regional integration, especially that among developing countries,
can be considered more favorably.'93 Thus, it is important that the NEAC should
not only employ no protectionism, but also make the outside neighboring coun-
tries understand the necessity of its integration. In the globalized world, where
one state's or one region's matter can be directly related to conflicts involving the
interests of other states or regions, the assent of related countries is essential. Sup-
port from major powers, especially the United States, Russia, 94 and the EU is im-
portant. Through the process of persuasion, countries outside the NEAC region
can be convinced that the NEAC integration is not intended to exclude them, but
instead to be useful to them.
6. Geographic Proximity
Regionalism generally refers to an uneven concentration of economic flow
or the arrangement of foreign economic policies among a group of countries in
close geographic proximity.'95 There is also an attitude that distance between
states and the transport costs create a trade bloc. 9 6 Contrary to the definitions
that geographic proximity is an element in regional integration, there also are
definitions of regionalism formulated in non-geographic terms. For example,
regionalism may be defined as a group of countries collectively relying on one
member country's currency, which constitutes a currency region, although
countries that share common socio-cultural backgrounds without geographic
proximity could also be considered regional members.'97 Globalization, with its
193. Bhagwati & Panagariya, supra note 123, at 33-35.
194. Even if the influence of Russia has been reduced since the end of the Cold War, Russia is still
a powerful nation. Furthermore, with its abundant resources, Russia would continue to play a
certain role in Northeast Asia. Due to its growing concern about Northeast Asia, Russia at-
tempted to rebuild relations with North Korea by the Treaty of Friendship. Herbert J. Ellison,
Russia, Korea, and Northeast Asia, in KOREA'S FUTURE AND THE GREAT POWERS 169-70, 179-80
(Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings eds., 2001).
195. See Mansfield & Milner, supra note 26, at 3-4.
196. See JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY SYSTEM 30
(1997).
197. See Benjamin J. Cohen, The Political Economy of Currency Regions, in POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF REGIONALISM, supra note 26, at 50-5 1.
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rapid progress in information and communication technology, 98 certainly
dilutes the effects of geographic proximity. The Internet has contributed signif-
icantly to a borderless global economy by making physical distance often irrele-
vant. Some analyses of regionalism focus on the wide variety of preferential
economic arrangements negotiated by states, for instance, the U.S.-Israeli Free
Trade Area, which does not involve geographic proximity.199 However, the def-
initions that do not emphasize geographic proximity are mostly concerned with
exceptional cases which are based on alternative elements, such as the heritage of
colonial relations or the relation of strong military allies. The EU has integrated
geographically proximate countries, and though the United Kingdom has a
close historical relation with the United States, it is now a member of the EU, not
NAFTA. Similarly, the United States is not a member of the EU," ° but it has
much in common with European culture. Japan is not a member of NAFTA,
but it is one of the biggest trade partners of NAFTA. Such facts show that geo-
graphic proximity is still an important factor for regional integration. Moreover,
geographic proximity is the essence of regional identity, especially in Northeast
Asia, because most of the peoples there were natives who have rooted in a given
place for five thousand years. The APEC-centered Asia-Pacific is sometimes
considered a new kind of region because it cannot be seen as a geographically
proximate entity. Unlike Northeast Asia, however, Asia-Pacific has no shared
history or common culture which forms a true regional unit.01
198. Neo-liberalism associated with globalization and the resulting collapse of time and space in
international economic transactions challenges many of the traditional values and practices of cor-
porate governance. See Suzanne Berger, Introduction, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPI-
TALISM 14 (Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore eds., 1996); JSEPA Study Group, supra note 44.
199. See generally Edward D. Mansfield & Rachel Bronson, The Political Economy of Major-Power
Trade Flows, in POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONALISM, supra note 26, at 188, 189-90.
200. See TEU, supra note 21, at art. 49 (restricting application for EU membership to "[any Eu-
ropean State which respects the principles set out in Article (6)(1)").
201. Under the influence of the United States, the APEC might be considered "another attempt
to ensure continued U.S. and Western hegemony of the non-Western world." Chandra Muzaffar,
Letter, Concern about APEC's Direction, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, December 8, 1993, at 12.
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7. Democracy and a Market-Oriented Economy
The EU is founded on the common principles of liberty, democracy, 2 2 re-
spect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.2"3 Any
European State that applies for membership in the EU is required to respect
these principles. 2' The EU also requires the existence of a market-oriented
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market
forces within the Union.2 5
Such requirements are also reasonable, on the whole, for the NEAC inte-
gration, and they would entail China's and North Korea's adoption of a market-
oriented and democratic reforms. China is on the path of transition to such a
market-oriented economy because of its early decisions in economic policy. As a
result, China's WTO participation will be a reality sooner, because China shall
be able to comply with the various obligations in the WTO rule.20 6 Concerning
the democratization requirement, especially the guarantee of human rights,
China's present situation is still dark, notwithstanding partial reform. First of
all, China should forbid routine torture and do away with cruelty2 7 in criminal
202. The 1994 Summit of the Americas for establishing FTAA also emphasizes preserving and
strengthening democracies. See Miami Summit's Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action,
December 11, 1994,34 I.L.M. 810,815. Cuba is the only country which has been excluded from the
Summit of the Americas. See generally id. at 810 (restricting participation in the Summit of the
Americas to democratic societies).
203. See TEU, supra note 21, at art. 6(1).
204. See id. at arts. 6(1), 49.
205. The 1993 Copenhagen European Council, concerned with the accession of countries in
Central and Eastern Europe, agreed on the following requirements: stability of institutions guar-
anteeing democracy; the rule of law; human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
and the existence of a functioning market-oriented economy. See Copenhagen European Council,
26 BULL. OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES nos. 6, 7 (June 1993).
206. See generally WTO Agreement, supra note 41, art. XII (declaring that "any
State... possessing "full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations... may ac-
cede" to the WTO).
207. Under Chinese criminal law, more than sixty crimes, many of them nonviolent, can be pun-
ished by death. See China: 'Striking Harder' than Ever Before, Amnesty International Online, at
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/ASA170222001 (visited on Feb. 27, 2004). The crimes in-
clude bribery, pimping, embezzlement, tax fraud, stealing petrol, and the selling of harmful food-
stuffs. See id. In recent years, China has sentenced to death and executed thousands of people. See
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law and in practice.28 As for North Korea, it will be not likely be qualified in
both adopting a market-oriented economy and democratizing, as long as the
present regime exists. This situation, then, implies two things. First, in the early
stage of NEAC integration, it will be hard to apply a strict democratization re-
quirement like that of the EU. Second, reform in North Korea and the unifica-
tion of the two Koreas should not be considered pre-requisites for early NEAC
integration, but a byproduct of the process of integration itself. The unification
of two Koreas, which can be an absorptive unification or any other kind, would
be the same process for North Korea's accession to the NEAC.
C. Special Requirements of the NEAC
1. Clearance of Post-War Claims
Quite a number of innocent people from China, Korea, and other East
Asian countries were sacrificed in the process of the Japanese invasion in World
War II. When the War was over, post-war problems were settled through peace
treaties with the Allies and joint treaties with neighboring countries (though not
yet with North Korea), for the sake of formality. However, even though post-
war problems were settled at the state level, and in spite of Japan's assertion that
all necessary post-war problems have been legally settled," 9 there remain a lot of
tort claims between Japan and its individual victims including soldiers, slave
laborers, 210 and sex slaves211 conscripted from Korea and China. Japan should
settle these problems as soon as possible.
208. See generally Report of the Committee against Torture, U.N. GAOR 51st Sess., Supp. No.
44, paras. 138-50, U.N. Doc. A/51/44 (1996) (noting the widespread practice of torture in China
and recommending solutions to deal with the problem).
209. In 2001, a Japanese court ruled against compensating a group of former South Korean sex
slaves and soldiers who were forced into service by Japan's army during World War II, relying in
part on a 1965 treaty establishing diplomatic ties between Japan and South Korea. See Japan Will
Not Pay Out Korean Sex Slaves, CNN Online, Mar. 26,2001, available at http'//www.cnn.com/ (last
visited Feb. 27, 2004).
210. See Donald Maclntyre, Fighting for Wartime Retribution, TIME AsIA, Jan. 17, 2000, available
at http://www.time.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
211. As many as 200,000 women, mostly Koreans, were abducted as sex slaves for Japanese sol-
diers during World War II. See Japan Will Not Pay Out, supra note 209.
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2. Peace and Stability in Northeast Asia
Today, the major uncertainty in Northeast Asia lies in the Korean penin-
sula, in which the two Koreas still exist with the prospect of unification in the
near future. There are two causes of uncertainty. One is the possibility of North
Korea's nuclear development and its missile tests and exports which influence
regional security beyond the Korean Peninsula itself. 12 The other is the possibil-
ity of rapid collapse of North Korea which would bring a jumble with a large in-
flow of refugees. The burdens on the region derived from the uncertainty would
be immense. 23 Even though no one can predict how and under what conditions
Korean unification will take place, a so-called "soft landing" is obviously desir-
able. 24 A soft landing means that North Korea will undergo some economic and
political reform with assistance from South Korea and international society.
Thus, a soft landing, which is now described as the "Sunshine" policy of South
Korea, would be the least costly way to guarantee peace and stability in the
Korean peninsula. The Sunshine policy would also promote a new security
framework on the Korean peninsula that would consolidate peace and stability
in the region by engaging North Korea in a serious dialogue so as to remove its
threat. 15 However, such a policy has not brought visible results except for the
212. See Hisashi Owada, An East Asian Security Order for a Globalizing World, in EAST AsIA, supra
note 1, at 80. In November 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush urged North Korea to allow in-
spections for weapons of mass destruction if it wanted better relations with the United States.
North Korea is believed to have "5000 tons of chemical weapons and an unknown stockpile of
germ warfare agents, including anthrax and smallpox." N. Korea Slams Call for Arms Inspections,
CNN Online, Nov. 29, 2001, available at http.//www.cnn.com/ (last visited on Feb. 27, 2004).
213. The world began to realize that peace and security had become a universal or global respon-
sibility. After the Cold War, such recognition has been reinforced by a number of causes, includ-
ing global threats to peace and security, the global challenges of underdevelopment, poverty, mass
migration, and global treatment of the environment. See Jost Delbrijck, Globaliztion of Law, Poli-
tics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic Law: A European Perspective, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 9, 13 (1993). Among the causes listed above, North Korea poses a problem for the Northeast
Asian region and the world with respect to peace and security, underdevelopment, poverty, and
the threat of mass migration.
214. See Robert A. Scalapino, Korea and the United States: Looking to the Twenty-first Century, in
THE Two KOREAS AND THE UNITED STATES,supra note 24, at 274-77.
215. See Owada, supra note 212, at 80.
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first South and North summit and a few reunions of separated families. It may
be "unwise to abandon all 'sticks' and rely wholly upon 'carrots'."216
Territorial disputes, such as the Dok-do Conflict between Korea and Japan
and the Joado Conflict between China and Japan, are restrained under the
present situation.
21 7
Peace and security in Northeast Asia is not only an indispensabl require-
ments for the NEAC integration but also one of the goals of that integration.
D. A Plausible Way to Meet the Requirements
1. Confidence Building and Harmonization
Since European countries have shared similar culture with languages based
on the same Latin roots, they could move faster toward a community. In con-
trast, lack of such linguistic homogeneity in Northeast Asia hinders cooperation
among the countries. Furthermore, their approaches to co-operation are based
on confidence-building, peer pressure, and trust rather than formal agreements
and institutions.
21 8
To achieve such homogeneity and confidence among Korea, China, and Ja-
pan, they need: the support of less developed regions; human capital develop-
ment; the removal of obstacles in travel; and the strengthening of infrastructure
for development in information and communications technology, and improve-
ment in transportation. Such work could be done at both the non-governmental
and governmental level.
Supporting less-developed regions, like North Korea, implies two things.
First it implies a reduction of the development gap among different countries and
216. Scalapino, supra note 214, at 280. In September 2001, the South Korean Unification Minister
resigned following the passing of a no-confidence motion in the parliament because he was in
charge of the policy towards the North and had come under increased attack in South Korea for
being 'too soft' on the communist North. See No-Confidence Vote Rains on Korea 'Sunshine' Policy,
CNN Online, Sept. 3, 2001, available at http'//www.cnn.com/ (last visited Mar. 7,2004).
217. Some Koreans maintained that the Yanbian Korean Minority Autonomous Region of
China, whose border was obscure before Japanese rule in the Korean peninsula (1905-1945), was
a part of Korean territory. Concerning this problem, China protested to Korea in 1995. See Zhao,
supra note 24, at 143.
218. See Higgott,supra note 13, at 47.
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the management of instability, such as the EU's various structural funds.219 Such a
program could be a carrot for inducing reform in less developed counties. Like the
EU's CAP22 or assistance to disadvantaged regions,22' supporting less developed
regions should continue even after integration has begun. A civilian or an interna-
tional cooperative system to develop Russia, China, and North Korea, like that of
the UNDP-TRADP222 would be important in that respect, as would be economic
cooperation between South and North Korea.223 The Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization, an organization similar to some early European insti-
tutions, is expected to manage instability."4 The unification of the two Koreas
could be aided by the regional integration as the EU is about to incorporate former
219. See Instrument for Structural Polices for Pre-Accession (ISPA), Council Regulation 1267/
99, art. 6-7, 1999 O.J. (L 161) 73-86; see also The Special Accession Programme for Agriculture
and Rural Development (SAPARD), Council Regulation 1268/99, 1999 O.J. (L 161) 87-93 (sup-
porting pre-accession measures for agriculture and rural development in the applicant countries
of central and eastern Europe in the pre-accession period).
220. See generally BERMANN ET AL, supra note 20, at 1063-80.
221. See GATT 1947, supra note 41, art. XVI; see also WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures, art 8.2 (b), available at www.ia.ita.doc.gov/; East Asia Vision Group Report,
supra note 31, at 22 para. 90.
222. Since 1991, the Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP) has aimed at provid-
ing a basis for multilateral cooperation among the countries in Northeast Asia by developing the
Tumen River area into an international hub of transportation, processing, and manufacturing
under the development strategy of "gradual harmonization." The project is managed by the
UNDP, while the two Koreas, China, Russia, and Mongolia are participating as full members and
Japan, Finland, and Canada are taking part as observers. See Tumen River Area Development
Programme, at http'//www.undp.org/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2004) (UNDP report on the TRADP
program).
223. Besides thousands of tons of food and artificial fertilizer aid, the trade volume between the
two Koreas was USD 425 million in 2000. Thirty-nine South Korean companies promote inter-
Korean joint ventures. The Mt. Kumgang tourism project consisted of more than four hundred
thousand South Koreans during the period from 1998 to 2001, which resulted in HyunDai, the
hosting South Korean company, to pay about USD four hundred million to North Korea as the
admission fee. See Ministry of Unification, Inter-Korean Relations (Jan. 2001), available at http'/
www.unikorea.go.kr (last visited Mar. 7, 2004).
224. In exchange for North Korea's freezing and eventually dismantling its nuclear program, The
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is supplying North Korea with two
proliferation water reactor units and heavy fuel oil for heating and electricity. See generally Kedo:
Promoting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula and Beyond, available at httpJ/
www.kedo.org/ (last visited Mar. 7,2004).
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Communist countries. The goal of developing human capital for NEAC integra-
tion is cultivating regional leaders 225 and increasing competitive power. Joint train-
ing of young, elite students from the region would help to resolve the lack of
regional homogeneity.226 Through such training, prospective leaders would
achieve mutual understanding and closer relationships.227 Developing human cap-
ital provides the key competitive advantage in a knowledge-based economy.
228
The qualifications and standards for professionals should be universal, with com-
mon recognition and administration of the licenses of lawyers and doctors.
The flow of human capital with goods, service, money, and information,
which will create a larger flow of culture and technology, bring about better har-
monization within NEAC region, and provide a strong platform for NEAC in-
tegration. A visa-free agreement among Korea, China, and Japan would reduce
obstacles to travel. 29 Information and communications technology has trans-
formed the global economy and their infrastructure and the skillful use of infor-
mation have become cornerstones of economic growth in the Internet
economy.23 ° In fact, the infrastructure for information technology, like the rail-
roads of Europe in the nineteenth century, connects various regions and world
more closely. Also, in order to increase the flow of men and goods in the region,
infrastructure for transportation is important.23" '
225. As the ECSC was inspired by Jean Monnet, the French proponent of European integration,
regional integration is influenced by the will of leaders. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 20, at
1063-80.
226. See East Asia Vision Group Report, supra note 31, at 24 para. 98. The Transnational Law
and Business University is an example of an institution that increases regional academic inter-
action and exchange. See Transnational Law and Business University, at http://www.tlbu.ac.kr
(last visited Mar. 7,2004).
227. Discussions have taken place between Japan and Singapore on harmonizing university cur-
ricula and exchanging professors and students. See, e.g., JSEPA Study Group, supra note 44, at
§§2-36, 2-37.
228. See id. at §2-35.
229. Korea and Japan agreed on temporary visa-free travel during the FIFA 2002 World Cup,
which was co-hosted by both countries. With entry to the WTO, China enhanced a measure for
freer foreign travel.
230. See JSEPA Study Group, supra note 44, at §1-4.
231. The two Koreas are working on connecting a railway and a highway between Munsan and
Kaesong. The construction is taking place within the Demilitarized Zone. Economically, the
transportation link will reduce shipping costs between the two Koreas, and once the inter-Korean
railway is linked to the Trans-Siberian or Trans-China Railway, a Northeast Asian railway net-
work would be activated. See http://www.unikorea.go.kr (last visited Nov. 24, 2001).
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2. Institutionalization
In order to build a basic community system, there would first need to be a
multilateral cooperation framework, such as the APEC and the ARF, so that the
representatives of the members may have a permanent channel for exchanging
their views and build up respect and confidence among them. Southeast Asia
has had regional networks, such as the ASEAN, but in Northeast Asia, with the
United States as a stabilizer, Korea, China, and Japan have depended on mostly
bilateral relationships.
In November 2001, Korea, China, and Japan agreed to establish a trilateral
forum of economic ministers to strengthen economic cooperation among
them.23 2 Through this forum, the three countries promoted the possible cooper-
ation by constant effort. This trilateral forum would be a stepping-stone for
NEAC economic institution building. The more important thing is that the
three states should build supranational institutions concerning economic inte-
gration as soon as possible, as the High Authority of the ESCS had some supra-
national power even its early stage.233 The economic institutions would also deal
with the financial arrangements
The security integration model embodied by NATO and the EU, which is
firmly rooted in shared values and interests, is not workable because of the di-
versity of interests in the Northeast Asian region.2 Neither is the hegemony
(balance-of-power) model an adequate model for the NEAC security net-
work,235 for it would deepen the major power's skepticism. In the early stages of
the NEAC, the "multi-layered network model" '236 would be reasonable, because
multilateral security cooperation must be seen as a supplement, and not a re-
placement of existing bilateral relations, such as Korea-United States and United
States-Japan. The first layer of such a model would consist of bilateral arrange-
ments to deal with concrete security needs, because the existing Korea-United
232. See Begawan, supra note 103; see also Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official Website, at
http://www.mofa.go.jp (last visited Mar. 7,2004).
233. See D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 12-13 (3rd ed. 1982).
234. See Owada, supra note 212, at 82.




States and United States-Japan security relations are still important to regional
stability. The second layer would be an NEAC political institution, like the early
CSCE in 1975,237 which would be intergovernmental and would have a political
secretariat. Such an institution could deal with security issues by promoting a
common policy and develop as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter
VIII of the U.N. Charter.238 The third layer would be a broader multilateral se-
curity institution, which includes the United States, Russia, the EU, and the
ASEAN. This third layer would be a regional framework for consultations on
issues affecting common regional security interests.239 For this third layer, an al-
ready existing framework, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) could be
used.24 ° Concerning this NEAC security institution, the following things must
be considered: the NEAC security integration should be accompanied by eco-
nomic integration; a mature form of security integration needs time;24 with re-
spect to regional security functions, even the most advanced form of regional
security integration, namely the OSCE, is not based on treaty, but based on pol-
icy commitment;242 and security integration today must respond to today's de-
mands, such as protecting human rights, 243 and collective defense against global
terrorism.
244
237. See Marc Weller, The European Union within the "European Security Architecture', in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 120, at 78-80.
238. Regional arrangements for peace and security are recognized by the U.N. Charter. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 53, para. 1.
239. See EAST ASIA, supra note 1, at 6.
240. See East Asia Vision Group Report, supra note 31, at 17, para. 63. The first ARF meeting, in
1994, gathered foreign ministers of Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, the EU, Indonesia, Japan,
Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, PNG, Philippines, South Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the
U.S. and Vietnam. The ARF's members are twenty-three countries, including Cambodia in 1995,
India and Burma in 1996, Mongolia in 1999, and North Korea in 2000. See Australian Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ARF Membership, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/ (last
visited Mar. 7, 2004).
241. The CSCE was created in 1975 as a child of detente and as a result of Europe's combined se-
curity efforts after World War I; another twenty years had to pass before the OSCE was created
in 1995 as a more developed form of CSCE. See Weller, supra note 237, at 78-82.
242. See id. at 82-83.
243. See Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Summit Lisbon Document
(Dec. 1996), available at http://www.osce.org/docs/.
244. See East Asia Vision Group Report, supra note 31.
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3. Strong Dispute Settlement System (DSS)
A well functioning community requires mechanisms to solve immediate
disputes and to promote long-term community goals.245 A DSS in a regional in-
tegration would make the integration firm by interpreting and applying agree-
ments on integration and community rules, just as the DSB of the WTO is "a
central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trad-
ing system." '246 Significant roles of the EU in the international system include ef-
fective dispute settlement and treaty enforcement in the process of economic
integration as well as the role of removing trade barriers among its members.247
If there is a provision in a RTA between two countries (e.g., Korea and China)
that asks for certain free trade measures from each country, it would be better
for both countries to comply with the provision than if both breach it. If only one
country breaches the provision, that country gets more benefits.
Figure 7 illustrates the hypothetical matrix,24 s namely the Prisoner's Di-
lemma,249 which does not change if a country breached a provision where there
is not a strong form of DSS."' Under a strong DSS that could provide sanc-
tions25 1 against breach, and if the value of the sanction is (-4), the matrix will be
changed as shown in parentheses. 25 2 Such an analysis shows that a strong DSS
245. See Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough, Dispute Settlement in International Trade:
Regionalism and Procedural Coordination, in POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONALISM, supra note 26, at
151-60.
246. Philip 1. Levy & T.N. Srinivasan, Regionalism and the (Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement
Access, in TRADING BLOCS: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ANALYZING PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREE-
MENTS, Supra note 121, at 534.
247. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 187.
248. Seeid. at 33-35, 187.
249. See EDGAR K. BROWNING & JACQUELINE M. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND APPLI-
CATIONS 435-37 (4th ed. 1992); see also HOEKMAN & KoSTECKI,supra note 43, at 109-10.
250. Two jurisdictional models can be inferred from the present international judicial system.
The first model is the facultative jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which de-
pends on the party states, although the Statute of the Court includes an optional clause. See
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 34 para. 1 & art. 36 para. 2. The other model
is the obligatory jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) related to the subject issue of
the EU treaty and its ability to hear various kinds of actions. See CRAIG & DE B6RCA,Supra note 19,
at 34; BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 363 (3d ed. 1999).
251. Even under a strong DSS, there remains the serious question of, "What is the sanction?" See
HOEKMAN & KoSTEKI, supra note 43, at 74-96.




China Comply 31 /( ,
10 1 28
Breach 2(8) 3 5(1) 51
Figure 7: Hypothetical Matrix
could be a driving force for regional integration. 253 Certainly, besides the Euro-
pean Court of Justice of the EU, many regional communities have obligatory ju-
risdictions. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa has broad
jurisdiction over inter-state disputes, as well as disputes between members and
the Council.254 NAFTA255 members wanted strong mechanisms for dispute
settlement when they negotiated the establishing agreement.
256
253. The Advocate-General of the ECJ gives the Court an independent opinion concerning cases
by considering the EU's interests. JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 105 (1999).
254. See Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Treaty, November 5,
1993, art. 24, 33 I.L.M. 1067. The COMESA itself may take action against defaulting members.
Any person, without restriction, may ask the Court to make a determination under the COMESA
about its member's measures. See id. at arts. 25, 26. Also, the Court of the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) has jurisdiction over disputes among members or between
members and its institutions regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty. See COLLIER
& LowE, supra note 253, at 109-10.
255. The DSS of NAFFA is similar to that of the WTO. These systems are a mixed form of ar-
bitration and litigation. See generally RALPH H. FoxsoM ET AL., NAFTA: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED
COURSE BOOK 425-41 (2000) (discussing the weight and status of dispute settlement with
NAFTA). Parties must agree on the resolution of the dispute, in conformity with the determina-
tions and recommendations of the final panel report. See North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), Dec. 9, 1992, art. 2018,32 I.L.M. 612,697. The Free Trade Commission is empowered
to deliver interpretations of the treaty to any domestic court in a member country, as a preliminary
ruling of the ECJ. See id. at art. 2020. The panel's decisions concerning investor dispute and anti-
dumping or countervailing duties are also binding. See id. at art. 1136 para. I & art. 1904 para. 9.
256. Canada and Mexico wanted a strong DSS to monitor the United States' alleged abuse of
trade laws. For Canada and the United States, a DSS eases worries that reliance on Mexico's legal
system will weaken NAFTA's enforcement. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT,
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 37 (1992).
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The NEAC should adopt a strong form of DSS which can maintain the bal-
ance of power between the NEAC and the sovereignty of the members, and be-
tween the DSS and the economic institution. That means that the DSS of the
NEAC should be a supranational institution like the NEAC economic institution.
CONCLUSION
As a regional substantial socio-economic integration under GATT article
XXIV, the NEAC should be supranational, while maintaining members'
sovereignty.
Given the empirical lessons from European integration, the trade diversion
effect, or the decrease of welfare that would follow NEAC integration, is not se-
rious. On the upward slope of supply curves, trade diversion improves the terms
of trade of members relative to non-members. Even though the inside supply
prices rise, it may increase the inside suppliers' surplus. Also, the net increase in
product cost will be distributed inside the community, which may bring another
gain in the unemployment situation. Freer flowing of inputs after regional inte-
gration also increases regional welfare.
The establishment of the NEAC will require regional identity, communica-
tions and transactions, and respect for the rest of the world. With various insti-
tutions for confidence-building and harmonization in the region, some
institutions like the early form of European integrations should be built. A
strong DSS would make the NEAC integration especially firm.
